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1. See Symposium , Public Values in an Era of Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1211
(2003).
2. See, e.g., Sim on Domberger &  Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector:
Theory, Evidence, Prospects, 13 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 67, 72-75 (1997).
3. See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J.
(forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 23-24, on file with the author) (contending that prison
privatization threatens to erode fundamental public values such as the humane treatment of
inmates and the integrity of the incarceration system).
4. Such efficiency gains are themselves a matter of dispute. See, e.g., ELLIOTT D. SCLAR,
YOU DON’T ALWAYS GET W HAT YOU PAY FOR: THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVATIZATION 47-70 (2000).
5. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1374-76 (2003) (arguing that privatization limits the reach of constitutional norms and
proposing a revival of the nondelegation doctrine as a m eans of applying these norms to a
variety of privatized governmental activities).
6. See, e.g., Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543,
549 (2000) (arguing that contract can be a tool for extending public law values to a variety of
settings in which the government enters into agreements with private entities to provide
services).
7. See, e.g., ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION
THROUGH LAW REFORM 137-81 (2004) (arguing that, while privatization has helped create a
“democracy deficit,” new opportunities have also emerged for promoting democratic
accountability through enhanced transparency and citizen participation).
INTRODUCTION
The privatization of governmental functions has long since
become a fixture of the American political landscape. From the
management of prisons, to the provision of welfare and other
services, to the running of schools, federal and state governments
have handed over more and more tasks to either for-profit or
nonprofit private enterprises. Indeed, a 2003 Harvard Law Review
symposium went so far as to declare ours an “Era of Privatization.”
1
And while some scholars have extolled the cost savings that
privatization may bring,  others have expressed deep misgivings,
2
arguing that privatization threatens to erode legal and democratic
accountability.  Such scholars worry that, because private actors are
3
usually not subject to the constitutional and administrative law
norms that apply to governments, any purported efficiency gains
from privatization  may come at the cost of losing important public
4
values.  Finally, an emerging middle ground position embraces
5
privatization while seeking new mechanisms for extending public
values through contract,  democratic participation,  and other
6 7
modes of accountability. 
138 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
8. See infra Part I.B.
9. See James Larry Taulbee & Marion V. Creekmore, Jr., NGO Mediation: The Carter
Center, in MITIGATING CONFLICT: THE ROLE OF NGOS 156, 156-71 (Henry F. Carey & Oliver
P. Richmond eds., 2003).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See, e.g., BEYOND UN SUBCONTRACTING: TASK-SHARING WITH REGIONAL SECURITY
ARRANGEMENTS AND SERVICE PROVIDING NGOS (Thomas G. Weiss ed., 1998) (analyzing
increasing practice of UN to partner with regional security organizations and NGOs)
[hereinafter UN SUBCONTRACTING]. 
12. See, e.g., Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 3, on file with the author).
13. Jonathan Turley, Soldier of Fortune—At What Price?, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2004, at
B11.
Despite this rich debate about privatization in the domestic
context, far less attention has been paid to the simultaneous
privatization of what might be called the foreign affairs functions of
government. Yet privatization is as significant in the international
realm as it is domestically. The United States now regularly relies
on private parties—both for-profit and nonprofit—to provide all
forms of foreign aid (including emergency humanitarian relief,
development assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction),  to
8
perform once sacrosanct diplomatic tasks such as peace negotia-
tions,  and even to undertake a wide variety of military endeavors.
9
These military functions include not only support services such as
constructing weapons and building barracks, but also core activities
such as training the military, gathering intelligence, providing
security services, and even conducting combat-related missions.
10
Nor is this development confined to the United States. Other
countries, as well as international organizations such as the United
Nations, have privatized many aspects of their work.  Indeed, some
11
“failed” states have relied almost exclusively on private actors to
perform both international and domestic roles of government, using
private military companies to fight their wars, foreign
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to provide their essential
social services, and foreign for-profit companies to build their roads,
dams, and other infrastructure.  
12
One need only look at recent events to glimpse the significance of
this trend. For example, not only are there approximately 20,000
private military contractors in Iraq,  but the Abu Ghraib prison
13
scandal revealed that even such sensitive tasks as military interro-
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14. See Joshua Chaffin, Private Workers Found Central to Jail Abuse: Fay Report on Abu
Ghraib Points to Reliance on Contractors for What Were Once Military Jobs, FIN. TIMES, Aug.
27, 2004, at 7.
15. Id.
16. Lynda Hurst, The Privatization of Abu Ghraib, TORONTO STAR, May 16, 2004, at F3.
17. Chaffin, supra  note 14.
18. See John Solomon, FBI Investigating Halliburton’s No-Bid Contracts, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Oct. 28, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/contract/2004/1028green
house.htm.
19. See Felix Rohatyn & Allison Stanger, The Profit Motive Goes to War, FIN. TIMES, Nov.
17, 2004, at 19.
20. Throughout, I use the term “privatization” to refer to the practice of “retaining
collective financing but delegating delivery to the private sector” rather than removing certain
responsibilities from the collective realm  altogether. See JOHN DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION
DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 215 (1989).
gations have been privatized.  Moreover, according to a military14
report, over one-third of the private interrogators at Abu Ghraib
lacked formal military training as interrogators.  As one of these
15
interrogators revealed, “cooks and truck drivers” were hired because
the private company in charge of providing interrogation services
was “under so much pressure to fill slots quickly.”  It is not
16
suprising then that many reported incidents of abuse at Abu Ghraib
have now been tied to these private contractors.  Meanwhile, on the
17
foreign aid front, the FBI is investigating whether the Pentagon
improperly awarded Iraq reconstruction contracts on a no-bid basis
to Halliburton, a company with close ties to the White House and
Defense Department.  Indeed, the extent of Halliburton’s contracts
18
in Iraq gives a sense of the scope of privatization: these contracts by
themselves are estimated at nearly $15 billion, more than twice the
cost to the United States of the entire 1991 Gulf War.  
19
Despite the magnitude of these developments and their poten-
tially far-reaching consequences, international law scholars have
not yet focused sufficiently on privatization as a comprehensive
trend in the international arena, let alone considered its implica-
tions. To be sure, many scholars have, over the past two decades,
challenged the state-centered focus of traditional international law
scholarship and instead emphasized the growing importance of
non-state actors. Yet, even these scholars have not homed in on
privatization specifically: the growing phenomenon of governments
delegating to private actors various foreign affairs functions
formerly provided by states.  Thus, we have seen work on how
20
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21. See infra text accompanying notes 116-23.
22. See generally MICHAEL EDWARDS, FUTURE POSITIVE: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1999) (examining the new relationships that have arisen and will
develop through international co-operation); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW W ORLD ORDER
(2004) (describing the political world as a complex global web of government networks); Julie
Mertus, From Legal Transplants to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise
of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1335, 1336-38 (1999) (discussing the
rise, development, and future of transnational civil society); Peter J. Spiro, New Global
Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the “Unregulated” Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO
L. REV. 957, 958-59 (1996) (examining the rise of nongovernmental organizations). 
23. Although some scholars of international law and policy have (to a degree) focused on
privatization in this sense, they have studied only specific contexts and have not explored the
variety of mechanisms that might be used to hold private actors accountable, nor have they
drawn on the domestic administrative law framework. See generally P.W . SINGER, CORPORATE
W ARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY (2003) [hereinafter SINGER,
CORPORATE W ARRIORS] (security); Leon Gordenker & Thomas G. Weiss, Devolving
Responsibilities, in UN SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 11, at 30 (foreign aid); Todd S. Milliard,
Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Private Military
Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. 1 (2003) (security); Clifford Rosky, Force, Inc.: The Privatization
of Punishment, Policing, and Military Force in Liberal States, 36 CONN. L. REV. 879 (2004)
(security); Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms
and International Law , 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521 (2004) [hereinafter Singer, Vacuum
of Law] (security); Ian Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve? Trends and Issues in the Relationship
Between Northern NGOs and Northern Governments, in STAKEHOLDERS: GOVERNMENT-NGO
PARTNERSHIPS FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, at 7 (Ian Smillie & Henny Helm ich eds.,
1999) (NGOs) [hereinafter Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve?]; Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence
of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Com panies, International Law, and
the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 75 (1998) (security); Tina Garmon, Note,
Domesticating International Corporate Responsibility: Holding Private Military Firms
Accountable Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 11 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 325 (2003)
(security). At the same time, domestic administrative law scholars have not, to date, applied
their insights to the international context. Martha Minow’s recent work identifying the
problems of military privatization, see Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Private Police,
Prisons, and War, Cecil A. Wright Lecture at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law (Jan.
20, 2004) (manuscript on file with author), and Fred Aman’s work identifying the democracy
deficit created by privatization and situating that deficit within a global context, see AMAN,
supra note 7, are important exceptions.  
international law norms might be extended or reinterpreted to apply
to specific non-state actors, such as guerrilla organizations, terrorist
groups, and corporations.  There has also been much discussion
21
about the more general role of NGOs, international civil society, and
networks of state and non-state actors.  But none of these inquiries
22
is framed as an examination of the particular practice of government
privatization.
23
As a result, international law scholars have not offered a
systematic analysis of how privatization in the international and
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24. See infra text accompanying notes 106-15.
25. See, e.g., Thomas Catan, Private Armies March into a Legal Vacuum: Growing Use of
Contractors for Duties Formerly Carried Out by the Official Military Has Left an
Accountability Gap , FIN. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at 8 (“These ‘private soldiers’ have been
operating in effect in a legal lim bo, with precious few rules governing their activities.”); P.W.
Singer, Above Law, Above Decency , PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 9, 2004, at B1 (“That
private contractors are interrogators in U.S. prison camps in Iraq should be stunning
enough.... But even more outrageous is the fact that gaps in the law may have given them a
free pass so that it could be impossible to prosecute them for alleged criminal behavior.”).
transnational sphere might affect norms of accountability crucial
both to the rule of law and to democratic legitimacy. Yet, at least on
its face, privatization seems to be as consequential internationally
as it is domestically. Indeed, because most formal international law
instruments apply only to governmental actors,  we face the specter
24
(as with domestic U.S. constitutional law) of private contractors
falling through the cracks of the international legal regime and
evading accountability altogether.
25
So, is the sky falling on international law? This Article argues
that it is not. Rather, privatization in the international sphere
need not actually result in less accountability, legal or otherwise.
Indeed, the opposite may sometimes be the case because, unlike in
the domestic context, legal accountability is actually very difficult
to achieve under international law with respect to either state
or private actors. Accordingly, though privatization may take
constitutional norms out of the equation domestically (leading to a
dramatically reduced scope of accountability), no equivalent to that
constitutional baseline exists in the international realm. Such
failures of accountability are, of course, a cause for concern, and I
would join with most international human rights scholars in
regretting the relative weakness of international law. Ironically,
however, this very weakness means that, when foreign affairs
functions are transferred to private actors, any reduction in
accountability likely will not be as great as in the domestic sphere,
where the baseline of accountability for government action is far
more robust. In addition, the very fact of privatization—with its
hybrid public-private character—may actually open up alternative
norms and avenues of accountability beyond the formal instruments
of international law. Thus, I argue that accountability and public
142 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
26. See infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
27. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New
Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1266-70 (2003).
values can not only be maintained but in some cases even increased
in an era of privatization. 
Such accountability, however, will not come exclusively (or per-
haps even primarily) from formal international legal instruments.
Certainly these instruments can be amended or reinterpreted to
bring non-state actors working in a quasi-governmental capacity
within their ambit. This amendment and reinterpretation process
has been the principal response of international law to the rise of
non-state actors,  and it is an important and necessary first step.
26
But it is only a first step, because formal international law instru-
ments are a relatively weak accountability mechanism even with
regard to state actors, let alone private entities.  
This Article, therefore, takes a different approach. Drawing on
the extensive domestic administrative law literature on privatiza-
tion, I argue that international law scholars must consider three
additional modes of accountability that may be important specifi-
cally because of the relationships between states and the private
actors working for them under contract. Each of these three modes
of accountability has been discussed extensively by administrative
law scholars,  but has remained under-theorized in the interna-
27
tional law literature. First, domestic scholars have examined the
idea of democratic accountability and have attempted to respond to
the concern that privatized government functions might render
those functions less accountable to the public at large. Although
democratic accountability questions are obviously more complicated
in the international sphere—because those affected by a governmen-
tal (or quasi-governmental) act are most likely not members of
the polity of the government authorizing the act—we shall see
that norms of transparency and democracy may still provide an
important check. Second, provisions in government contracts
might explicitly incorporate a variety of disciplining measures,
from international law norms, to rules regarding training, to
assurances about transparency and public participation, to specific
output requirements. Such provisions could render private actors
contractually liable for violations and provide for various forms of
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monitoring. Third, we can turn our attention to what might be
called internal institutional accountability, the idea that organiza-
tions and corporations, whether public or private, have their own
formal accountability mechanisms and informal cultures, both of
which might have a restraining effect. Using these various account-
ability mechanisms we can begin to construct policies that will more
effectively address the increasing privatization of the international
realm.
In addition to these alternative accountability mechanisms, the
domestic literature emphasizes several alternative norms, as well.
Although international law has usually focused only on the norms
of human dignity embodied in formal legal instruments, we might
expand the frame to include norms concerning the rational and
nonarbitrary provision of services as well as various anti-corruption
norms. Though these norms have not been extensively studied by
international law scholars, they provide additional bases for
evaluating the consequences of privatization and thinking creatively
about how best to respond to concerns about the different types of
abuses committed by contractors.
In discussing these various accountability mechanisms and
applicable norms, this Article seeks to provide a more comprehen-
sive taxonomy and framework for evaluating all forms of privat-
ization in the international sphere. By doing so, we can see that
privatization may result in radically decreased accountability in
some contexts but potentially increased accountability in others
and that various forms of privatization may threaten different
mechanisms of accountability and implicate different norms. Only
such a comprehensive framework, then, will allow us to truly
evaluate privatization in its many guises.
My argument proceeds in three parts. Part I describes privatiza-
tion efforts in two very different areas: military activities and
foreign aid. By providing examples from such disparate contexts, we
can begin to grasp the full scope of the phenomenon, and we will be
better able to see how efforts to ensure accountability in one context
might or might not be usefully employed in another. Part II begins
by describing the way in which international law has usually
responded to the problems posed by non-state actors and suggests
that a similar strategy of expanding the formal legal norms of
144 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
international law to apply to private contractors is not sufficient.
This Part then identifies the domestic administrative law literature
on privatization as a potential source of wisdom in helping both to
articulate various concerns that may accompany the handing over
of governmental functions to non-state actors and to formulate
appropriate responses to those concerns. In particular, this Part
discusses the various norms and accountability mechanisms that
collectively provide a more comprehensive framework for analyzing
privatization, both domestically and internationally. Finally, Part
III applies this framework to both the military and foreign aid
contexts, considering each of the accountability mechanisms in turn.
In pursuing this project, I aim to avoid the unfortunate polariza-
tion that often dominates discussions of privatization, in which
some herald all privatization for increasing efficiency while others
bemoan each step away from direct government services for
purportedly leading to a decline in accountability, oversight, and
public participation. With regard to efficiency arguments, this
Article will have little to say. I suspect that some privatization of
what I have called foreign affairs functions will lead to greater
efficiency, while there are other areas where government can
actually provide the service in question more efficiently and at lower
cost. In any event, a detailed analysis of the efficiency gains or
losses from privatizing foreign affairs functions is beyond the scope
of this Article. Indeed, a central premise of this Article is that
regardless of the possible efficiency gains from privatization, we
should make sure that important public values and the mechanisms
to enforce them are made part of the privatization scheme itself.
To those inclined to reject all efforts at privatization because they
necessarily reduce accountability, this Article will have more to
offer. To begin with, as the history of privatization makes clear, it
is very difficult to find some halcyon era when services were clearly
governmental and accountability was the norm. Instead, the
blending of public and private has always occurred to some degree
or another. Indeed, though I tell a story of increasing privatization
of governmental functions in the international sphere, I do not in
any way suggest that such a progression has taken place in a
steady, straight line. Rather, many of the so-called governmental
functions I describe have in the past been performed by private
2005] GOVERNMENT FOR HIRE 145
28. See Peter Lindseth, Agents Without Principals?: Delegation in an Age of Diffuse and
Fragmented Governance (Univ. of Conn. Sch. of Law W orking Paper Series, Paper No. 18,
2004), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/uconn/ucwps/papers/18 (paper prepared for the Second
W orkshop in Self-Regulation, European University Institute, Nov. 14-15, 2003).
actors. Privatization has therefore been cyclical, and it is difficult to
say that any functions are intrinsically “core state functions.” In
addition, given that the unmistakable trend of recent decades is
towards increasing privatization, it seems unhelpful simply to resist
that trend in toto. While it may well be that something is lost when
certain activities and policy choices are removed from the public
sphere and are therefore less subject to public deliberation and
oversight,  those concerned about maintaining some form of
28
accountability cannot simply mourn the loss of the public sphere.
Instead, this Article, while not neglecting possible areas of concern,
seeks to suggest ways in which public-private governance arrange-
ments could be structured to preserve important public-regarding
features. Finally, as discussed above, it is not as if in the interna-
tional sphere the mechanisms of accountability are so robust even
for government actors. Thus, privatization in this context may be
less of a threat and more of an opportunity.
Of course, some might see any efforts to import public-regarding
accountability mechanisms into privatization as misguided because
one of the key reasons governments privatize is to avoid account-
ability. Thus, one might think that such governments would resist,
say, the inclusion of more robust oversight provisions into their
contracts. Yet, while avoiding accountability may be one reason
governments privatize, governments are not monolithic, and there
are always actors within bureaucracies seeking greater oversight.
Empowering those actors to lobby for an expanded monitoring role
is one of the key aims of this Article. In addition, government actors
are susceptible to outside pressure from NGOs and other watchdog
groups. Such groups should, therefore, focus greater attention on
how privatization is managed and how governments and interna-
tional organizations can pursue more effective oversight practices,
rather than simply resisting privatization altogether.
Ultimately, the expanded framework I articulate may allow us to
more easily distinguish those circumstances in which privatization
may be benign from those in which the risk of impunity is too high.
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29. See Brooks, supra note 12 (manuscript at 11).
30. See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POST-MODERNITY (1990) (examining
the rise of postmodernist culture); SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996) (discussing the way in which economic globalization and
immigration have eroded state sovereignty).
Moreover, this broader vision of both the avenues of accountability
available and the norms served will, at the very least, provide a
more comprehensive set of options for introducing policy reforms. In
any event, by opening a dialogue between international law and
administrative law scholars on the subject of privatization, this
Article seeks creative engagement concerning this important trend.
After all, if we really are now in an era of privatization, it is crucial
that scholars work together to develop responses. Thus, administra-
tive law scholars must see privatization as a global issue and not
simply a domestic one. And international law scholars must
conceive of privatization as a topic worthy of comprehensive study
in its own right. Together, we must begin to seek new ways to
embed public values into the hybrid governance structures that are
rapidly emerging in this public-private century. 
I. PRIVATIZATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
Just as the state is turning more and more to private actors to
fulfill the domestic functions of government, private actors are
increasingly fulfilling its foreign affairs functions as well. To be
sure, many of the functions that are now being shifted to private
actors under contract with the government were, at some point in
the past, similarly performed by private actors. Indeed, the
modern state itself emerged only relatively recently, in a process of
increasing centralization and bureaucratization that culminated in
the mid-twentieth century.  Thus, one cannot say that there is a
29
one-way move toward ever-increasing privatization. Yet, the
unmistakable trend in the past several decades has been toward
more and more private contracting, a hollowing out and decons-
truction of the state that is in a sense the classic condition of
postmodernity.  This trend raises questions about the extent of
30
private actors’ accountability—to the international community and
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to various domestic and transnational communities—under
international law. 
This Part provides a brief overview of the extent of privatization
in two key areas in which governments act internationally: military
activities and foreign aid. I will focus primarily on the United States
government, though I will note some examples involving other
governments and international organizations, as well. I will both
discuss the rationales behind governments’ increasing use of private
actors and introduce the potential problems this trend raises for
legal accountability.
I choose to offer examples from these two, very different, areas
because I believe a broader lens is necessary to understand both the
scope of privatization and the possible responses that might be
available. Indeed, it may be that mechanisms of accountability
available in one context could be imported into another. For
example, forms of third-party accreditation that are now being used
to vet companies seeking contracts to provide development aid
might also be used in certain military settings. Similarly, by
considering two different areas of privatization we are reminded
always to consider not only norms of human dignity but also norms
of rational, nonarbitrary conduct and anti-corruption norms when
evaluating privatization efforts. In any event, viewing seemingly
unrelated privatization contexts encourages us to look at privat-
ization as a comprehensive trend and not just a set of discrete,
issue-specific problems. Such a comprehensive approach may help
spur creative problem solving and may encourage scholars in
multiple areas to work together to forge responses.
A. Military Functions
Perhaps no function of government is deemed more quint-
essentially a “state” function than the military protection of the
state itself. Indeed, scholars of privatization in the domestic sphere
have often assumed that privatization of the military is one area
where privatization does not, or should not, occur.  For example,
31
some have argued that, by hiring private armies to keep itself
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32. See, e.g., Rosky, supra note 23, at 882-83.
33. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 3-17.
34. See Rebecca Rafferty Vernon, The Future of Competitive Sourcing, Battlefield
Contractors: Facing the Tough Issues, 33 PUB. CONT. L.J. 369, 371-72 (2004).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Milliard, supra note 23, at 2-3.
38. Id. at 7.
39. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 8.
secure, the state would threaten its own very existence because it
would have no way to control these private military actors.  
32
Yet, as the pathbreaking work of Peter W. Singer has shown,
governments around the world, including the United States, are
increasingly hiring private military companies to perform core
military functions.  For decades, of course, the U.S. government has
33
entered into agreements with private companies to build weapons
and other equipment, as well as to provide the basic goods necessary
to run a government agency—everything from desks to office
supplies.  But increasingly military contracts with private firms
34
have extended beyond ordinary office procurement and agreements
to purchase weaponry, and now include contracts to provide
logistics and other services to active troops in the field.  Moreover,
35
these services include not only support services, such as food,
accommodations, and sanitation for troops on the battlefield, but
also core functions such as translating, intelligence gathering, and
even troop training—functions that, for at least the past fifty years,
uniformed members of the armed services have performed virtually
exclusively.  
36
One might argue that the privatization of military services is
nothing new. Mercenaries, loosely defined as soldiers working for
private gain, have appeared throughout history. Indeed, the use of
mercenaries predates the national armies that arose only after the
Treaty of Westphalia.  Yet, by the twentieth century, at least in the
37
West, only pockets of mercenaries, such as the French Foreign
Legion, remained.  Apart from some postcolonial wars of independ-
38
ence, where mercenaries often fought against national liberation
movements, the bulk of military security work has been performed
by professionalized, bureaucratized armies and not private actors.
39
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41. Singer, Vacuum of Law , supra note 23, at 523.
42. Vernon, supra note 34, at 407-09.
43. See infra text accompanying note 56.
44. See infra text accompanying notes 56-57.
45. See Barry Yeoman, Need an Army? Just Pick Up the Phone, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2004,
at A19. It should be noted, however, that these cost savings have not been conclusively
dem onstrated. Indeed, private military companies typically pay their employees more than
governm ent employees, and because of the types of contracts they receive, private military
companies are particularly susceptible to cost overruns.
46. Samantha M. Shapiro, Iraq, Outsourced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2003, at F1.
47. See infra text accompanying note 54 (listing countries that have hired private
companies to perform military functions).
It is against this backdrop that we can consider the increasing
reprivatization of military functions in the past two decades. 
If one looks to U.S. forces actually deployed on the battlefield, the
ratio of private contractors to troops has increased dramatically in
the past fifteen years. In the first Gulf War, the ratio was one in a
hundred;  in the current war in Iraq, the ratio is one in ten.
40 41
Although the United States has not yet used the employees of
private companies in actual combat roles, it has deployed them to
fulfill tasks such as military intelligence gathering, troop training,
and support functions that are very close to combat; indeed, these
private actors have the power to wield force in a variety of circum-
stances.  Other countries, such as Sierra Leone and Angola, have
42
explicitly hired private armies.  In many modern conflicts, these
43
private military companies have played a decisive role.
44
Military privatization can perhaps be explained primarily by the
promise of cutting costs.  The government need not offer pensions
45
or benefits to employees of private companies working under
contract, and it can hire contractors on a short-term basis, thereby
decreasing the size of the uniformed military. In addition, private
military companies may offer greater flexibility. Such companies
are touted for their ability to work quickly, constructing bases, for
example, on very short notice.  In states with ill-equipped, poorly
46
functioning militaries, private companies can also provide badly
needed expertise to help train, or even replace, the government
troops.  Finally, private military companies may enable states to
47
deploy forces with lower domestic political costs because fewer
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49. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 142-45.
50. See Halliburton Company, About KBR, http://www.halliburton.com/kbr/aboutKBR/
index.jsp (last visited Sept. 20, 2005). 
51. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 139.
52. See MPRI, About MPRI, http://www.mpri.com/site/about.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2005).
53. See Press Release, Army Reserve 88th Regional Readiness Command, Team MPRI
Looking for ROTC Instructors (July 3, 2000), http://www.usarc.army.mil/88thrsc/news/
archive/news_rotc_instructors_needed.asp; see also MPRI, National Overview , at http://www.
mpri.com/site/ nat_overview.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
uniformed troops are put at risk, thus keeping official casualty
figures down.  
48
A brief overview of the type of work some of the leading private
military companies perform gives a sense of the breadth and depth
of their operations. For example, U.S.-based Kellogg, Brown, and
Root (KBR) began performing logistical support for U.S. military
operations in Somalia in 1992 and has since won contracts from
the U.S. government to provide such support in Rwanda, Haiti,
Kuwait, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  Under these
49
contracts, KBR has built and maintained military bases, trans-
ported troops and equipment to and on the battlefield, repaired
and maintained roads and vehicles, distributed water and food to
troops, washed laundry, refueled equipment, attended to hazardous
materials, and performed related environmental services.  These
50
operations are extremely lucrative; Singer estimates that KBR
earns roughly $1.7 billion annually from military work.  
51
Beyond the logistics support functions of KBR, another U.S.
company, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), is
one of the leading firms to provide core military functions such as
troop training and intelligence gathering. Founded by a group of
retired senior military officers in 1987, MPRI began by teaching
U.S. troops how to use equipment, but has since expanded to per-
form a wide range of training and advising functions.  Beginning
52
in 1996, the company has run the ROTC training programs at
universities around the country and has played a key role in
numerous programs to educate U.S. forces, including the training
of officers, war gaming, and tactical planning.  Like KBR, MPRI
53
has expanded its services beyond the U.S. government to a wide
variety of countries, including Croatia, Bosnia, Angola, Saudi
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56. See We’re the Good Guys These Days, THE ECONOMIST, July 29, 1995, at 32; Garmon,
supra note 23, at 331-34.
57. See Zarate, supra note 23, at 94-97.
58. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 101.
59. South Africa im plemented the Foreign Military Assistance Act to limit mercenary
activity in 1998. See Nicole Itano, Africa Takes Tough Stand on Coups, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON.,
Aug. 31, 2004, at 6.
60. SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 118.
Arabia, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea,  as well as to54
regional intergovernmental programs such as the African Crisis
Response Initiative.   
55
Finally, military companies have provided direct combat services.
Probably the best known and most controversial is the now
dissolved South African company Executive Outcomes, which drew
its personnel largely from the apartheid-era South African Defense
Force, and won contracts with governments in Angola, Sierra Leone,
Uganda, Kenya, South Africa, Indonesia, Congo, and others to
engage in direct combat during the 1980s and 1990s.  The company
56
provided both manpower and weaponry, and engaged in its own
intelligence gathering. Indeed, its activities in Sierra Leone and
Angola are widely believed to have altered the outcome of the
conflicts in those states.  Thus, while the firm has simultaneously
57
been vilified as a “mercenary army of racist killers” and praised as
saviors,  both critics and supporters agree that the firm has been
58
effective. Ultimately, links to the apartheid past, made prominent
in the hearings of the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, led to increased regulation in South Africa and
prompted the company to dissolve.  Related and spin-off companies
59
are still active, however.
60
Significantly, private military companies performing each of these
functions—logistics, advising, and direct combat—have engaged in
activities that have raised questions about the willingness of their
employees to abide by international law standards that normally
would apply to governmental actors, as well as about the difficulty
of holding these employees accountable for any violations. For
example, the firm CACI provided military intelligence operatives
who were deployed to Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where they,
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61. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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(2004).
63. See MAJ. GEN. ANTONIO TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY
POLICE BRIGADE, 26, 36, 48 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA REPORT]; see also HERSH, supra note
62, at 32-34, 61; Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y.
TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A15.
64. See infra note 207.
65. See infra text accompanying notes 208-17.
66. See Milliard, supra note 23, at 19-69 (summarizing treaties).
67. HERSH, supra note 62, at 53.
68. Id.
69. Farah Stockman, Terror Suspects’ Torture Claims Have Mass. Link, BOSTON GLOBE,
Nov. 29, 2004, at A1. 
alongside the uniformed military personnel, abused Iraqi de-
tainees.  Indeed, the uniformed personnel on the scene often took
61
orders from the contract intelligence operatives.  Translators
62
hired under a similar contract with the firm Titan, Inc. were also
implicated in the abuse.  And while the Geneva Conventions and
63
the Convention Against Torture clearly prohibit the actions of the
military personnel,  some commentators have pointed out that the
64
treaties’ applicability to non-state actors is ambiguous, and that
even if such norms do apply, fora for holding them accountable
under such norms are limited.  Moreover, while multiple treaties
65
ban the use of certain categories of mercenaries outright, broad gaps
in the definition of “mercenary” leave most types of work by private
military companies outside the treaties’ prohibitions.
66
The U.S. government’s use of private contractors to transport
terrorism suspects to countries known to practice torture has
raised similar questions. For example, on December 18, 2001,
American operatives reportedly participated “in what amounted to
the kidnapping of two Egyptians ... who had sought asylum in
Sweden.”  Believed to be linked to Islamic militant groups, the
67
Egyptians “were abruptly seized in the late afternoon and flown
out of Sweden a few hours later on a U.S. government-leased
Gulfstream 5 private jet to Cairo, where they underwent extensive,
and brutal, interrogation.”  The company that owns the jet is
68
apparently a corporation registered in Delaware and represented by
the Massachusetts law firm Hill & Plakias.  As in the case of the
69
Abu Ghraib abuse, the Convention Against Torture prohibits
2005] GOVERNMENT FOR HIRE 153
70. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhum an or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46 2, U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., art. 3, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 116 (1984)
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73. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One’s Own, HARPER’S, Feb. 1997, at 48.
74. W arren Hoge, U.N. Criticizes Iraq Occupation Oil Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004,
at A21.
governments from taking such actions, but its applicability to
private actors is ambiguous.
70
Private military companies engaging in direct combat are perhaps
the most notorious for committing atrocities. According to a former
UN special rapporteur, the presence of mercenaries “is a factor
which tends to increase the violent and cruel nature of specific
aspects of the conflict in which they are involved.”  Adventurer
71
mercenaries fighting in the postcolonial wars in Africa, for example,
engaged in human rights abuses on a massive scale. The French
mercenary Costas Giorgiu, who led a band in the Angolan civil war
in the 1970s, regularly fired on civilians and summarily executed
many of his own group when he believed they might desert.  More
72
recently, during the conflict in Sierra Leone, officers of Executive
Outcomes, working under contract with the government, reportedly
ordered employees carrying out air strikes against rebels to “[k]ill
everybody,” even though the employees had told their superiors they
could not distinguish between civilians and rebels.  Neither the
73
Executive Outcomes employees, nor the company itself, has been
held legally accountable.
Finally, private military companies have also been implicated in
abuses of other norms, such as norms prohibiting fraud and waste.
For example, KBR’s more than $10 billion in contracts with the U.S.
government in Iraq “have been dogged by charges of preferential
treatment, overbilling, cost overruns, and waste.”  Indeed, the chief
74
contracting officer for the Army Corps of Engineers has publicly
accused the Army of granting preferential treatment to KBR
(through its parent company, Halliburton) when awarding contracts
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in Iraq and Bosnia, thereby violating U.S. contracting regulations.75
Likewise, the FBI has begun investigations concerning the legality
of various Defense Department contracts in Iraq.
76
B. Foreign Aid
Although privatization in the military context has received far
more attention, overseas aid is another area in which states are
increasingly turning to private contractors to fulfill functions
formerly performed directly by the state. From emergency humani-
tarian relief to long-term development assistance to post-conflict
reconstruction programs, private actors are performing more and
more of these functions under contract with the U.S. and other
governments. In emergency situations, for example, the U.S.
government has contracted with private companies such as KBR to
build refugee camps,  and with nonprofit NGOs such as Save the
77
Children to deliver relief supplies and medical services.  Similarly,
78
with respect to longer-term development assistance, the U.S.
increasingly has used international and foreign NGOs to provide aid
overseas, rather than providing aid directly to foreign govern-
ments.  Reconstruction assistance has followed a similar trend, as
79
the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan make clear, where multimillion
dollar contracts have been awarded to private for-profit companies,
as well as nonprofit organizations, to undertake post-conflict recon-
struction tasks.  
80
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86. Id. at 253.
To be sure, as in the case of the military, private foreign aid is not
a completely new development. In the United States, private groups
provided aid for specific causes overseas long before the government
developed foreign assistance programs.  Indeed, the practice of
81
government-sponsored foreign assistance did not develop in a
significant way in the United States until the period following
World War II, with the initiation of the Marshall Plan.  In 1961,
82
the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) was
created, and the focus of aid turned to underdeveloped nations.
83
Throughout this period much of the aid consisted of direct grants to
needy countries, though even then the U.S. government disbursed
some aid through NGOs.  In the last two decades, however, the
84
government has channeled more and more foreign aid through
nongovernmental actors, both nonprofit, and (increasingly in recent
years) even for-profit organizations. Indeed, while total U.S. aid to
developing countries is declining,  more and more of that aid is
85
being delivered through private actors.  
86
The most dramatic shift from direct government aid to aid
disbursed by private organizations under contract with the govern-
ment has occurred with respect to emergency aid. For example,
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at www.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/publications/annual
_reports/pdf/AR2003.pdf.
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Paradigm , in UN SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 11, at 139, 146 (“By the mid-1980s, a
noticeable change in donor funding policy had occurred, from direct donor assistance to
recognized governments in favour of international support for private, non-governmental
sectors.”). 
90. Ian Smillie, NGOs and Development Assistance: A Change in Mind-set? in UN
SUBCONTRACTING, supra note 11, at 185 [hereinafter Smillie, Change in Mind-set].
91. See id. Moreover, the line between humanitarian relief and longer-term development
assistance is blurring, as humanitarian relief organizations increasingly seek to provide
emergency funds that will assist in long-term development prospects. See USAID, OFF. OF
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY COOPERATION, 2004 REP. OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES ENGAGED IN
OVERSEAS RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT REGISTERED WITH THE U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV.,
available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_
cooperation/volag04.pdf [hereinafter 2004 VOLAG REPORT] (“Gradually, [private volunteer
for fiscal year 2003, the USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance spent sixty-six percent of its nearly $300 million budget
through NGOs.  Other countries and international organizations
87
are similarly turning more and more to NGOs to deliver emergency
relief.
88
Longer-term development aid has followed a similar trend. By
the mid-1980s, development agencies had begun to shift their focus
from general funding for foreign governments to more targeted
direct support both to grassroots organizations helping to eradicate
poverty and to other civil society institutions seen as necessary for
democracy and development.  In this new environment, NGOs were
89
considered better able to connect with civil society actors and the
grassroots, and thus became favored as aid providers. In addition,
many NGOs had evolved into large, efficient organizations, “some
operating like tightly-knit corporations, others as loose but well-
connected networks.”  Accordingly, these NGOs appeared to be the
90
best positioned to respond to both complex emergencies and the
goals of long-term development.  
91
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more sustainable development programs designed to address the root causes of poverty and
disaster mitigation.”).
92. Smillie, United States, supra note 81, at 257.
93. Contracts and Grants, supra note 80. Although USAID has awarded a total of sixteen
contracts, one of those contracts was awarded to the U.S. Air Force, so I did not include it in
the total. Id. See also Rony Brauman & Pierre Salignon, Iraq: In Search of a ‘Humanitarian
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269, 271 (Fabrice W eissman ed., 2004) [hereinafter HUMANITARIAN ACTION] (noting increased
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police force. See Center for Public Integrity, W indfalls of W ar, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&ddlc=17 (last visited September 27, 2005).
Finally, privatization is also taking place in the arena of post-
conflict reconstruction. In recent years, USAID has relied heavily on
U.S. and local organizations and corporations to engage in recon-
struction efforts in Bosnia, Haiti, and Angola, among others, and it
has even established a separate Office of Transition Initiatives in
order to coordinate such efforts.  It is in this context that we are
92
seeing perhaps the greatest use of for-profit as well as nonprofit
organizations operating under contract with governments and inter-
governmental organizations. In Iraq for example, USAID has
awarded fifteen contracts worth a total of $3.2 billion to for-profit
companies, while it has awarded only six grants worth $40 million
to nonprofit organizations.
93
As governments (and international organizations) have turned
more and more to private actors to deliver aid, abuses of the norms
of human dignity committed by these actors have again raised
complicated questions about the application of international law.
Although aid workers do not by any means regularly mistreat aid
beneficiaries, such incidents occur more often than one might
suspect. For example, employees of Dyncorp Inc., a private corpora-
tion under contract with the U.S. Government to train police in
Bosnia in the 1990s, joined a sex-trafficking ring and committed
numerous acts of rape, sexual abuse, and exploitation.  Even staff
94
members of not-for-profit organizations have at times been impli-
cated in abuses. For example, a recent study of refugees and
internally displaced persons in West African camps in Guinea,
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supra note 93, at 297, 302 (describing such abuses in refugee and IDP camps in Guinea,
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HUMANITARIAN ACTION supra note 93, at 43, 57 (describing sexual exploitation by aid workers
in IDP camps in Sierra Leone).
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N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 833, 834-35 (2003).
97. See SEXUAL VIOLENCE REPORT, supra note 95; see also Malinda M. Schmiechen,
Parallel Lives, Uneven Justice: An Analysis of Rights, Protection and Redress for Refugee and
Internally Displaced Women in Camps, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 473, 490 (2003).
98. For example, rape or other sexual abuse committed by a public official would in many
cases constitute torture under the Convention Against Torture, but similar actions taken by
a non-state actor would not, unless undertaken with the “consent or acquiescence” of such an
official. Torture Convention, supra note 70, at art. 1. Rape and related sexual violence are also
considered war crimes if committed in either international or internal armed conflict, but only
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organizational plan or policy. ICC Statute, supra at arts. 7(1)(g), 7(2)(a).
99. See, e.g., SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION, REPORT TO
CONGRESS, 14-17 (2005), available at http://www.sigir.mil/pdf/SIGIR%20Jan05%20-%20
Report%20to%20Congress.pdf (describing unsatisfactory audit of KBR).
Liberia, and Sierra Leone reported widespread rape and sexual
exploitation of women and children by many actors, including aid
workers.  The aid workers and peacekeeping forces allegedly relied
95
on their positions of relative power to use “the very humanitarian
aid and service s intended to benefit the refugee population as a tool
of exploitation.”  In some camps, it appears that even necessities
96
such as using a toilet were sometimes conditioned on the willing-
ness to perform sexual favors.  As in the military context, although
97
it would generally violate international agreements for governmen-
tal officials to commit such acts, the status of these private contrac-
tors is more ambiguous.
98
Private aid providers have also been implicated in waste,
incompetence, and corruption. Iraqi reconstruction aid has become
notorious in this regard.  Less well known are the numerous errors
99
committed during humanitarian relief efforts in Rwanda. After the
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particularly after the 1994 Rwanda emergency”).
101. See Alex Jacobs, Regulating Humanitarian Interventions, Presentation for the 21st
Century Trust (Apr. 3, 2003), at 9-10, available at http://www.mango.org.uk/pool/
Regulating%20Humanitarian%20Interventions %20AJ%203Apr03.pdf. 
102. Id.
103. See id. at 10.
genocide, humanitarian aid organizations conducted a study to
determine what they could have done better. To be sure, these
organizations provided relief to an enormous number of victims and
faced extraordinarily difficult conditions: brutal mass killings of
between 500,000 and 800,000 people, an ensuing epidemic of cholera
and dysentery that killed hundreds of thousands more, and an
international community that refused to halt the violence. Yet the
study concluded that aid providers’ lack of coordination, duplicative
efforts, and poor decision making in numerous instances also
contributed to the deaths of tens of thousands of people from
disease.  Similar problems have arisen in other contexts. For
100
example, a report evaluating relief provided in response to the 2001
earthquake in Gujarat, India that killed 20,000 people and damaged
or destroyed more than a million homes concluded that, although
victims received “substantial and timely assistance,” poor decision
making, duplicative efforts, and inappropriate priorities hurt aid
beneficiaries on the ground.  Indeed, aid organizations apparently
101
wasted hundreds of thousands of dollars on costly shipments of
materials available much more cheaply locally and focused on the
construction of large public buildings that the local government
would have rebuilt anyway at much lower cost.  These efforts
102
diverted resources more urgently needed for temporary shelters.
103
Thus, privatization of foreign aid may also raise questions about
the accountability of private actors under norms prohibiting
nonrational, wasteful, or corrupt governmental action—account-
ability both to populations paying for the aid as well as to aid
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104. See infra text accompanying notes 371-75. 
105. See Taulbee & Creekm ore, supra note 9 (discussing the Carter Center, a prominent
NGO involved in peacemaking and diplom acy).
beneficiaries themselves. In contrast to the norms of human dignity,
however, it is unclear whether international law even contains
norms that would bind public actors, let alone private ones, in this
context. Although some scholars and policymakers have argued that
norms protecting aid beneficiaries’ right to receive aid and to
rational decision making in the delivery of aid is emerging,  it is
104
unlikely that any such norms would apply to private organizations.
Finally, though I have focused here on military services and
foreign aid, it is worth noting that other foreign affairs activities,
such as peacemaking and diplomacy, have been privatized as well.
105
Accordingly, privatization is a significant phenomenon, and it is
unclear whether the formal instruments of international law are
adequate to respond to this trend.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, AND THE PROBLEM
OF PRIVATIZATION
Unlike international law scholars, those working in domestic
administrative law have focused extensively on the issue of
privatization and have understood privatization as an overarching
phenomenon requiring systematic study. Such study has involved
both the possible norms that may be imperiled by privatization and
the various mechanisms of accountability that might be used to help
ensure enforcement of those norms even in a world of increased non-
state power. Although it has not itself addressed privatization in the
international sphere, the domestic administrative law literature
thus offers a useful framework for considering the consequences of
privatization more generally. Accordingly, after briefly discussing
the limitations of the international law responses to privatization
to date, this Part builds on the domestic literature to identify a
series of substantive norms and accountability mechanisms that,
together, help provide a richer, more complex understanding of how
privatization may alter the regulatory landscape.
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106. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III)A, U .N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political R ights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
108. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
109. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
art. 2, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1, at 7 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280 [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
110. Torture Convention, supra note 70.
111. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of W ar,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Civilians Convention].
112. ICC Statute, supra note 98.
113. The Torture Convention, for exam ple, defines as torture only acts that are committed
“by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other
person acting in an official capacity.” Torture Convention, supra note 70, at art. 1. The ICCPR
likewise defines the rights to a fair trial as rights in proceedings before public “courts and
tribunals.” ICCPR, supra note 107, at art. 14.
114. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, I.C.T.Y. Case No. IT-96-21-T (1998) (Trial Chamber
Judgment) (convicting several individuals for war crim es including murder, torture, and
A. International Law
It is something of a truism that international human rights and
humanitarian law does not generally bind non-state actors in most
cases. The principal international human rights and humanitarian
law instruments of the twentieth century—the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights,  the International
106
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  the International Cove-
107
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,  the Genocide
108
Convention,  the Convention Against Torture,  the Geneva
109 110
Conventions,  and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
111
Court —were drafted primarily with states in mind. As such,
112
states are both the primary parties to the treaties and the central
bearers of rights and responsibilities. These instruments do grant
individuals rights, of course—such as the right to be free from
torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or the right to a
fair trial—but these are predominantly conceived as rights against
the state.  It is also true that individual members of state bureau-
113
cracies (and even corporations working in tandem with the state)
have been held criminally or civilly responsible, in both interna-
tional and domestic fora, for violating the rights articulated in these
instruments.  And in addition, some of these rights, such as the
114
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rape). Perhaps the most well-known domestic trial was Israel’s prosecution of the Nazi official
Adolf Eichmann for war crim es and crim es against humanity. See HANNAH ARENDT,
EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM 21 (1977). As to corporations, see, for example, Zyklon B Case (Trial
of Bruno Tesch and Two Others), 1-5 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF W AR CRIMINALS 93-102
(W illiam  S. Hein & Co. 1997) (U.N. War Crimes Comm’n ed., 1949) (prosecution of corporation
that provided gas for death chambers).
115. The Genocide Convention provides explicitly that “[p]ersons committing genocide or
any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are
constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.” Genocide
Convention, supra note 109, at art. 4. The definition of crimes against humanity requires only
that the attacks be committed as part of a “State or organizational” policy. ICC Statute, supra
note 98, at art. 7(2)(a).
116. See Sylvie Junod, Additional Protocol II: History and Scope, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 29, 30-
33 (1984).
117. See Theodor M eron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J.
INT’L L. 554, 554-55 (1995).
118. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the
Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 756-57 (2004).
119. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 526-30 (2001); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003).
120. See Peter J. Spiro, Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 161, 161-62 (2002). 
right to be free from genocide and crimes against humanity (as
defined in the recent statute of the International Criminal Court)
apply not just against the state but against individuals as well.
115
Yet, within the overarching framework of this body of law, the state
still remains at the core.
The twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have put
pressure on this state focus, as new categories of non-state actors,
such as guerrilla forces,  ethno-nationalist movements,  transna-
116 117
tional terrorist organizations,  multinational corporations,  and
118 119
NGOs  have all emerged as important actors on the world stage.
120
With the rise of each new category of non-state actor, international
law scholars, practitioners (and sometimes judges) have primarily
responded by seeking to bring that non-state actor under the inter-
national legal umbrella. Their approach has thus been predomi-
nantly normative and piecemeal: they have attempted to fill the
gaps in the state-centered international law regime by arguing
either that the law should expand to reach each type of non-state
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121. See Brooks, supra  note 118, at 746-54 (terrorists); Junod, supra note 116, at 34-38
(guerrillas and insurgents); Math Noortmann, Non-State Actors in International Law , in NON-
STATE ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 71, 72 (Bas Arts et al. eds., 2001) (NGOs);
Ratner, supra note 119, at 524-27 (corporations).
122. See, e.g., Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: Joint
Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International Criminal
Law , 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 77-80 (2005). 
123. Although a few scholars have focused on privatization as such, this work has been
piecemeal. See supra note 23.
124. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law , 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 952-58 (2004);
Ratner, supra note 119, at 531-34.
125. Gordenker & Weiss, supra note 79, at 40-43.
126. See DINAH SHELTON, COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE, THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING
NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (2003).
127. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 22.
entity,  or by deploying doctrines that have the potential to impose121
liability on non-state actors linked to the state.  
122
Such a response is essential; indeed, the idea that international
law norms should apply to non-state actors is a necessary premise
of this Article. Nevertheless, it is not a sufficient response both
because it fails to consider alternative modes of accountability
beyond formal legal mechanisms and because it neglects to address
other norms that might be implicated by governmental delegations
to non-state actors. This failure may stem in part from the fact that
scholars have focused on the rise of non-state actors generally,
rather than on the idea of privatization specifically.  And though
123
literature on corporate responsibility,  NGOs,  soft law,  and
124 125 126
transnational networks  has attempted to address some informal
127
modes of accountability (such as internal institutional accountabil-
ity and norm internalization), this work deserves to be expanded to
include other types of accountability mechanisms (such as contract
and democratic participation) and other areas of international
and transnational activity. The field is thus ripe for the fresh
perspective that the domestic administrative law privatization
literature provides.
B. Administrative Law 
By looking to domestic administrative law, we can first expand
the frame not only to include the norms of human dignity that are
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128. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976) (concluding that the Social
Security Adm inistration is subject to constitutional due process requirements and cannot
deny requested services without providing some minimum opportunity to be heard).
129. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
130. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
131. See, e.g., id. at § 706(2)(E); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 476-91
(1951) (defining the scope of substantial evidence review under the National Labor Relations
Act).
132. Mark Seidenfeld has offered an apt description of how courts applying a “hard look”
at agency decisionmaking can help to effectuate norms of rational, nonarbitrary, and non-
corrupt governance:
[U]nder the hard look test, the reviewing court scrutinizes the agency's
reasoning to make certain that the agency carefully deliberated about the issues
raised by its decision…. Courts require that agencies offer detailed explanations
for their actions. The agency's explanation must address all factors relevant to
the agency's decision. A court may reverse a decision if the agency fails to
consider plausible alternative measures and explain why it rejected these for the
regulatory path it chose.  If an agency route veers from the road laid down by its
precedents, it must justify the detour in light of changed external circumstances
or a changed view of its regulatory role that the agency can support under its
authorizing statute. The agency must allow broad participation in its regulatory
process and not disregard the views of any participants. In addition to these
procedural requirements, courts have, on occasion, invoked a rigorous
substantive standard by remanding decisions that the judges believed the
agency failed to justify adequately in light of information in the adm inistrative
record.
Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial
Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483, 491-92 (1997).
133. See id.
the primary focus of international law but also norms concerning
rational, nonarbitrary, non-corrupt governance. Both the U.S.
Constitution’s procedural due process requirement, which applies
to certain agency determinations and prohibits denials of benefits
without minimum procedural protections,  and the framework of
128
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)  itself reflect these
129
additional norms. Indeed, many of the judicial review doctrines in
administrative law—arbitrary and capricious review,  substantial
130
evidence review,  the “hard look” doctrine,  and so on—are
131 132
explicitly designed to try to ensure that governmental decisions
are based on reasoned deliberation, that they take into account
contrary evidence and points of view, and that they derive from
material found in the administrative record.  Beyond just
133
trying to ensure rationality, other laws—such as the Freedom of
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134. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
135. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000).
136. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552. For a discussion of state sunshine statutes and state court
decisions applying these statutes to privatized governmental action, see Craig D. Feiser,
Protecting the Public’s Right to Know: The Debate over Privatization and Access to Government
Information Under State Law , 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 825 (2000).
137. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976).
138. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367,
1403 (2003) (arguing that “[t]he danger is that handing over governm ent programs to private
entities will operate to place these programs outside the ambit of constitutional constraints,
given the Constitution’s inapplicability to ‘private’ actors”). 
Information Act (FOIA),  which may require governmental entities134
to release materials concerning their decision-making process; the
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),  which imposes open
135
meeting and disclosure requirements; and other so-called “sun-
shine laws,”  which delineate guidelines for public disclosure of
136
administrative processes—also seek to protect the administrative
decisionmaking process from undue influence or other forms of
corruption. Moreover, the idea that there is something akin to a
right to transparent, nonarbitrary government decision making
applies even when the effects of the government decision do not
themselves implicate constitutional norms of human dignity.
137
Thus, administrative law provides fertile ground for articulating
and defining important norms to be applied in the international
sphere as well.
In addition to articulating these norms, administrative law
scholars have also explored alternative mechanisms for attempting
to hold privatized action accountable. In the remainder of this Part,
I will briefly identify each of these accountability mechanisms.
Then, Part III will consider such mechanisms in the international
context.
1. Legal Accountability 
As with international law, the formal legal rules of constitutional
and administrative law are insufficient when confronting privatiza-
tion. This is primarily because, under the so-called “state action”
doctrine, these rules may not apply to private contractors.  The
138
state action inquiry, which asks whether “there is a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action” to justify
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139. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
140. See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1190-91 (1994) (advocating that private entities should be considered
state actors when they are the sole providers of public services and defining those services in
terms of contem porary shared understandings of government responsibilities rather than
traditional practice).
141. See, e.g., NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191-99 (1988) (holding that the National
Collegiate Athletic Association is not a state actor); S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 542-47 (1987) (holding that the U.S. Olympic Committee, a corporation
created by federal statute and given control over U.S. participation in the Olympics as well
as exclusive oversight of private amateur sports organizations participating in international
competition, is not a state actor); Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1008-09 (1982) (holding that
private nursing homes providing long-term care to Medicaid beneficiaries “are not state
actors, even though they ... operate under contract with the government and make need
determinations authorized by statute”); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 837-43 (1982)
(holding that private schools are not state actors even though the governm ent contracted with
the schools to fulfill its statutory obligation to provide education to special-needs students).
But see Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 291 (2001)
(holding that a private organization overseeing nearly all public and private high school
athletic events is a state actor); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 54-58 (1988) (holding that a
private doctor treating prisoners pursuant to a contract with a prison is a state actor).
142. See, e.g., Lindseth, supra note 28; Metzger, supra note 138, at 1442-45, 1456-500. For
an argument that private prisons, specifically, are unconstitutional delegations, see Joseph
E. Field, Making Prisons Private: An Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15
HOFSTRA L. REV. 649, 655-56 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, The Impact of the Delegation Doctrine on
Prison Privatization, 35 UCLA L. REV. 911, 914-15 (1988). For a similar argument about the
privatization of welfare services, see Dru Stevenson, Privatization of W elfare Services:
Delegation by Commercial Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 105-11 (2003). 
143. For example, health care providers could face malpractice or other tort actions. See
the application of constitutional norms  could, at least in theory,139
permit a finding of state action in many cases where government
has delegated its responsibilities to a private actor.  And indeed,
140
as discussed in Part III, certain private actors, such as private
prison guards, have sometimes been deemed to be state actors and
thus subject to constitutional norms. Yet, over the past three
decades, U.S. courts have been reluctant to find such a nexus,  and
141
most private contractors are not treated as governmental entities
for purposes of legal accountability.
In response, scholars have sought other ways of imposing formal
legal accountability. For instance, the nondelegation doctrine might
be revived and used to prevent governmental entities from handing
over too much power to non-state actors.  Alternatively, private
142
contractors could face nonconstitutional civil suits, which would not
require a nexus to state action.  In addition, statutes allowing
143
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Freeman, supra note 6, at 623 & n.324 (“Courts have grown receptive to patient attempts to
sue managed care organizations in negligence and wrongful death actions,” particularly “in
the context of ERISA, the federal statute that limits employee remedies against health care
organizations selected by employees as part of a benefit plan.” (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1994)). It is true that the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 2004 that ERISA preem pts patients
from suing under state tort law for an insurer’s refusal to pay for doctor-recommended
medicines and procedures. See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 124 S. Ct. 2488, 2492-93, 2502
(2004). Nevertheless at least one post-Davila verdict seems to indicate that negligence suits
regarding managed care will continue. See Brenda Sapino Jeffreys, Despite Davila, Widower
Successfully Sues HMO for Negligence, TEX. LAW., Aug. 1, 2005, at 1. Moreover, Davila would
not affect suits against the health care providers themselves.
144. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at 608; Eleanor D. Kinney, Private Accreditation as
a Substitute for Direct Government Regulation in Public Health Insurance Programs, 57 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., 47, 68 (1994) (“Some state statutes and judicial decisions have
recognized a private right of action to enforce state licensure laws particularly with respect
to nursing homes.”). Currently, however, courts do not generally find state provider contracts
to be a source of third-party beneficiary claims against nursing homes and other types of
service providers for statutory violations, and only rarely recognize private rights of action to
redress violations of federal law. Freeman, supra note 6, at 603; Richard B. Stewart & Cass
R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193, 1196 (1982).
145. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2000).
146. See, e.g., R ichardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997) (holding that private
prison guards do not enjoy qualified immunity); A Tale of Two Systems: Cost, Quality, and
Accountability in Private Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1868, 1882 (2002) [hereinafter Two
Systems] (arguing that, because of the possibility of private tort suits and unavailability of
qualified immunity for prison guards working in such prisons, “private prisons are, if
anything, more accountable ... than are public prisons”).
147. Courts might be willing to impose these values in some cases through suits for
enforcement through third-party beneficiary suits  or qui tam144
actions  could be expanded. Indeed, non-state actors may some-
145
times face greater prospects of liability because they would likely be
unable to take advantage of various immunity doctrines available
to state actors.  
146
On the other hand, these remedies would probably require that
the defendant commit gross violations of the norms of human
dignity before they could be viable. Thus, while tort claims against
non-state actors might be cognizable for the sort of conduct that
would give rise to an Eighth Amendment action alleging cruel
treatment, such an avenue would likely not be readily available
for alleged violations of the norms concerning rational and non-
corrupt governance discussed above. Accordingly, private tort suits
will rarely be able to vindicate concerns about mismanagement,
waste, corruption, due process, or arbitrary and capricious deci-
sionmaking.  Nevertheless, courts have been willing to read due
147
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negligent hiring, training, or supervision of employees. See, e.g., Jama v. Esmor Corr. Servs.,
Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 683-85 (D.N.J. 2004).
148. See, e.g., Ambrosino v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 899 F. Supp. 438, 445 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
(holding that termination of membership based solely on physician’s previous drug addiction
was arbitrary and capricious, and violated plaintiff’s common law right to fair procedures).
For an extensive discussion of these issues, see Michael Asim ow, News from the States, The
Private Due Process Train Is Leaving the Station, 23 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS (1998), available
at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/vol23no4/statenew.html.
149. See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, The Military Pocket Republic, 97 NW. U.L. REV. 1, 72 (2002)
(“This layer of agencies creates obvious problems for theories of democracy that emphasize
the ability of citizens to influence their government through participatory action or
deliberative process.”). But see Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1542 (1992) (arguing that agencies, because they
fall between the extremes of a “politically over-responsive Congress and the over-insulated
courts,” may be best situated to institute a civic republican model of policymaking). 
150. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
151. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000) (requiring that critical regulatory meetings be announced in
advance and be made open to the public).
152. Inspector General oversight arises from the Inspector General (IG) Act, codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-12 (1994). The IG Act authorized the creation of offices whose
mission is to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in their respective departments and
agencies across the executive branch. For an analysis of the role that inspectors general play
in various agencies, see Michael R. Bromwich, Running Special Investigations: The Inspector
General Model, 86 GEO. L. REV. 2027 (1998).
process terms into certain types of employment contracts,148
signaling the possibility that common-law courts could be a vehicle
for effectuating such broader public law values, regardless of state
action.
2. Alternative Mechanisms of Accountability: Democratic,
Contractual, and Institutional
Beyond formal legal accountability, administrative law scholars
have explored ways in which privatization may affect alternative
mechanisms of accountability. Such mechanisms can be grouped
into three categories: democratic accountability, contractual
accountability, and internal institutional accountability. Of
course, democratic accountability—the ability of the polity to
respond to (and therefore affect) governmental action—has always
been a central preoccupation of administrative law because
government-run administrative agencies exercise important
policymaking responsibility without a direct democratic check.
149
Indeed, FOIA,  FACA,  inspector general oversight,  whistle-
150 151 152
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Modern Law of Employee Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531 (1999) (analyzing the Act’s
provisions). Since enactment of the landm ark Civil Service Reform Act in 1978, hundreds of
state statutes have also been passed to protect whistleblowers. See Robert G. Vaughn, State
Whistleblower Statutes and the Future of Whistleblower Protection, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 581,
582-83 (1999) (collecting whistleblower statutes).
154. For a description of the civil service rules generally, see RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY
D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY: THE ECONOMICS
AND POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1994).
155. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000).
156. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000); see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1983) (requiring that regulators provide reasons for
their policies and base their decisions on an administrative record that is publicly available).
157. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (“The
Framers of the First Amendment .... protected the people against secret government.”).
158. See Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1507, 1509 (2001) (“Political accountability should be understood to include the
dem ocratic character of decision-making, the clarity of responsibility for an action or policy
within the political system, and the availability of the body politic to obtain accurate
information about a governmental policy or action.”).
159. Cary Coglianese, Administrative Law , in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
& BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 85-88 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Bates eds., 2001) (“Transparent
procedures and opportunities for public input give organized interests an ability to represent
themselves, and their constituencies, in the administrative process.... These procedures may
also protect against regulatory capture....”); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the
Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1043 (1997) (noting the judicial thrust toward
“changing the procedural rules that govern agency decisionmaking ... [to] force agencies to
open their doors—and their minds—to formerly unrepresented points of view, with the result
blower protection statutes,  civil service conflict of interest rules,153 154
notice and comment rulemaking,  judicial review of agency
155
decisionmaking under the APA,  and even the First Amendment
156 157
can be seen to embody concerns about transparency of governmental
processes.
Although such a focus on transparency obviously does not change
the fact that agency officials do not themselves stand for election,
transparency does seek to maintain a feedback loop between the
government and those affected by government policy. Indeed,
democratic accountability is not simply about making sure a voting
polity ratifies all governmental decisions.  Rather, it is concerned
158
with ensuring that there is some sort of dialogue between the
government and the governed to act as a disciplining check on
power and guard against the possibility of capture by interest
groups.  While the rise of administrative agencies creates concerns
159
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that capture would be eliminated or at least reduced”). On the other hand, some argue that
the focus on transparency can at times impede the ability of regulators to secure much-needed
information from the industries they regulate. See Cary Coglianese et al., Seeking Truth for
Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280 (2004)
(“We conclude that regulators’ need to secure information from those they regulate provides
a reason for preserving some degree of opacity in an otherwise transparent and accountable
regulatory process.”). 
160. See Mary L. Heen, Congress, Public Values, and the Financing of Private Choice, 65
OHIO ST. L.J. 853, 868 (2004) (“Politics offer a process for preference formation through the
protection of voting rights and procedures for political deliberation, including open
proceedings and constitutional protections for public discussion and criticism. Private firms
have fewer obligations to provide access to information about their operations or the reasons
for their decisions.”). Cf. Paul Starr, The Case for Skepticism , in  PRIVATIZATION AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES 25, 27-29 (W illiam T. Gormley, Jr. ed., 1991) (expressing concerns about
privatization). For example, federal contracting measures are generally exempt from notice
and comment requirements. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1053 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (ruling that a federal Request for Proposals and subsequent contract did not implicate
the rulemaking processes of § 553 of the APA). Similarly, the Model Procurement Code for
State and Local Governments allows a review of contracts only at the request of a bidder, not
the public. Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration: Rules, Discretion, and
Entrepreneurial Government, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1121, 1198 (2000) (citing Model Procurement
Code for State and Local Governments § 9-101 (1979)). 
161. AMAN, supra note 7.
162. Id. at 150.
163. See, e.g., Craig D. Feiser, Privatization and the Freedom of Information Act: An
Analysis of Public Access to Private Entities Under Federal Law , 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 21, 22-24
(1999).
for democratic accountability, privatization certainly takes these
concerns a step further because the private contractor is even more
removed from democratic oversight, and it may be much more
difficult to insist on any sort of transparency with regard to the
operations of the contractor.  
160
Despite the threats that privatization poses to legal and demo-
cratic accountability, the blended public-private power created by
privatization may offer new mechanisms for imposing accountabil-
ity, i.e., new ways of encouraging government and private actors to
adhere to norms of human dignity, good governance, and anti-
corruption. Scholars such as Fred Aman have argued that transpar-
ency laws can be extended and citizen participation increased to
enhance democratic accountability.  For example, Aman has
161
proposed that the APA notice and comment requirements could be
expanded to include government outsourcing of social services or
prison management.  Others have argued that FOIA and other
162
sunshine laws should apply to private contractors.
163
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164. Freeman, supra note 6, at 634.
165. Id. at 635.
166. Id. at 636.
167. See KEVIN LAVERY, SMART CONTRACTING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES 73 (1999).
168. As one commentator has noted, “[i]n the twenty-first century, in many agencies,
contracting management needs to come to be one of the central concerns of senior agency
political and career executives, the same way other organizational core competencies are.”
Scholars have also argued that the contractual agreements that
are the very engine of privatization can provide new forms of
governmental oversight and accountability. For example, Jody
Freeman, seeking to find a middle ground between the efficiency-
based supporters of privatization and the critics who fear that
privatization will thwart important mechanisms of accountability,
has contended that contracts can, through their terms, make
substantive and procedural “public law” values applicable to private
parties, as well as incorporate structural features and enforcement
mechanisms to enhance compliance. For example, states “could
require compliance with both procedural and substantive standards
that might otherwise be inapplicable or unenforceable against
private providers” and could mandate that personnel receive
training equivalent to that of analogous state actors.  Contracts
164
could also require compliance with specific performance standards
and include performance benchmarks, graduated penalties,
oversight by contract managers or independent observers, and
reporting requirements.  Along with these front-end contractual
165
terms to enhance accountability, contracts could also encourage
back-end enforcement in the courts when these mechanisms fail.
Contracts could thus explicitly permit third-party beneficiary suits
and even allow relevant interest groups to bring suit in some
contexts.  
166
Such an approach, of course, requires effective mechanisms for
ensuring compliance with whatever contractual provisions are
drafted. The literature on contract monitoring and compliance in the
domestic context suggests, however, that the available mechanisms
are imperfect at best. First, governments may not have any formal
system of contract management in place.  One of the challenges of
167
any contractual regime, therefore, must be to make sure that
contract compliance becomes a core task of government bureaucra-
cies.  Second, even with a robust system of governmental oversight
168
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Steven Kelm an, Remaking Federal Procurement 2 (Visions of Governance in the 21st Century
Program, Working Paper No. 3, 2002), available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/visions/
publication/ kelman.pdf (last visited May 13, 2005).
169. See W ILLIAM D. EGGERS, PERFORMANCE-BASED CONTRACTING: DESIGNING STATE-OF-
THE-ART CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION AND MONITORING SYSTEMS 2 (1997) (suggesting that
performance-based contracts, to be useful, should “clearly spell out the desired end result”).
170. See, e.g., Stephen D. Knight & S. Jun Jin, Compliance Problems for American
Contractors in Iraq, 24 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 5, 5 (2004) (“The essential problem  for
government contractors doing business in Iraq is the combination of too little time, ‘fluid’
statements of work, enormous risk, and the expectation of near-perfect contractor compliance
with both standard and special procurement requirements.”); see also id. at 6-7 (describing
reporting requirements). 
171. See, e.g., Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and Diminished
Democracy in Local Government Contracts for W elfare-to-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1559, 1605 (2001) (“Legally, of course, all that can be demanded is adherence to the
contract. Thus the outcomes expected must be stated as performance standards in order to
demand actual contractor performance.”). 
172. Jack M. Sabatino, Privatization and Punitives: Should Government Contractors Share
the Sovereign’s Immunities from Exemplary Damages?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 175, 191 (1997).
173. See Janna J. Hansen, Note, Lim its of Competition: Accountability in Government
Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2476 (2003).
in place, the sorts of contractual provisions Freeman envisions are
necessarily difficult to monitor because they do not lend themselves
to easily determined outcome goals or measures.  Third, compli-
169
ance concerns may result in onerous reporting requirements that
vastly increase the cost of privatization to both the contractor and
the governmental entity overseeing the contract (perhaps even
wiping out whatever purported efficiency gains the privatization
may have achieved) while not really providing increased account-
ability.  Fourth, judicial review of government contracting may be
170
unavailable because the contracts do not specify quantifiable
outcomes or clear processes, leaving no judicially administrable
standard.  And even if judicial review is available, a government
171
may incur significant litigation costs and other administrative
burdens, “siphon[ing] away public resources that could have been
devoted to, among other things, the effective implementation and
oversight of the contractors’ work.”  Finally, though an agency
172
could theoretically exercise oversight and terminate the contract
with a noncompliant firm, agencies may be reluctant to do so
because termination would force the agency to find other ways of
providing the good or service at issue.  
173
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174. Indeed, as Bradley Karkkainen has pointed out, the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI),
42 U.S.C. § 11023, which requires that industrial facilities report the release and transfer of
specific chemicals, has had a significant im pact on pollution emissions. See Bradley C.
Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking,
Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 287-88 (2001). According to Karkkainen, the
TRI, because it creates a performance metric, “both compels and enables facilities and firms
to monitor their own environmental performance” and “encourages them to compare, rank,
and track performance am ong production processes, facilities, operating units, and peer or
competitor firms.” Id. at 261. In addition, Karkkainen argues that the TRI data “subjects the
environmental performance of facilities and firms to an unprecedented degree of scrutiny
by their peers, competitors, investors, employees, consumers, community residents,
environmental organizations, activists, elected officials, regulators, and the public in general.”
Id. at 261-62. As a result, this transparency scheme “unleashes, strengthens, and exploits
multiple pressures, all tending to push in the direction of continuous improvement as facilities
and firms endeavor to leapfrog over their peers to receive credit for larger improvements or
superior performance.” Id. at 262. In addition, administrators— whether within companies or
in governm ent bureaucracies monitoring contract compliance— have a natural desire to
im prove what they have data about. Id. at 295-305. Thus, although information by itself does
not provide accountability, see id. at 338-45 (noting that some contractors may be
unconcerned about the mere release of information), it can enable other accountability
mechanisms. 
175. See id. at 287 (“Mandatory production and disclosure of [environmental] information
has prompted many firms to undertake ambitious voluntary emission reductions programs,
often far beyond the levels required under current regulations.”).
In spite of these imperfections, there are important benefits to a
contractual approach, not the least of which is that it can aid other
mechanisms of accountability. For example, with regard to legal
enforcement, the reliance on contract removes any state action
consideration, making the contract more readily enforceable in
ordinary civil suits, as long as the contractual provisions are
sufficiently specific. If there is concern that governments will be
overly hesitant to pursue breach of contract actions for violation of
public-regarding rules, one type of contractual provision might allow
citizen suits or at least public disclosure requirements so that
popular political (or economic) pressure could be brought to bear on
noncompliant contractors. Such public reporting might also allow
citizen watchdog groups (or even other competing contractors) to
monitor the effectiveness of the contract, publicize deficiencies, and
lobby government officials for change.  Finally, the contractual
174
approach may spur changes to institutional culture, leading to
additional compliance monitoring and oversight.
175
Such internal institutional accountability is another significant
avenue to explore. I use the term internal institutional accountabil-
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176. Sociologists, social psychologists, and organizational theorists have studied the ways
in which cultures internal to bureaucracies and other types of organizations, including for-
profit firms, shape the behavior of, and sanction, individuals within those organizations. For
several volumes of collected essays that have been particularly influential, see generally
CLASSICS OF ORGANIZATION THEORY (Jay M. Shafritz & J. Steven Ott eds. 2001);
ORGANIZATION THEORY (Oliver E. Williamson ed., 1990); ORGANIZATIONS: RATIONAL, NATURAL,
AND OPEN SYSTEMS (W. Richard Scott ed. 1987).
177. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 629 (describing codes of conduct of several professional
organizations). 
178. See F.W . MAITLAND, Trust and Corporation, in MAITLAND: SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 189-
95 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (1905) (describing the sophisticated nonlegal means of
enforcing order among members of these institutions).
179. Janet Koven Levit, A Bottom-Up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of
Three Trade Finance Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 184 (2005). See generally ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON, ORDER W ITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (drawing on
an empirical study of relations among cattle ranchers to develop a theory of nonlegal norms
as a source of social control); Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous Formation: The
Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 8-9 (2004) (using game theory
to argue that the existence of pre-existing networks enhances a private legal system’s ability
to enforce norms); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System , 21 J. LEG. ST. 115 (1992)
(discussing a system of “private lawmaking” in the New York Diamond Dealers Club); Stewart
Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55
(1963) (presenting empirical data on nonlegal dispute settlement in the manufacturing
industry).
ity to refer to cultural, organizational, and professional norms that
promote accountability. Bureaucracies, companies, and organiza-
tions have internal norms and values, as well as both formal and
informal modes of sanctioning noncompliance that may not rise to
the level of a court proceeding, criminal conviction, or civil damages
award but that nonetheless can have a significant disciplining or
punitive impact on an individual.  Indeed, over time the develop-
176
ment of professional standards of conduct may become a particu-
larly powerful force influencing behavior.  
177
These are not new insights, of course. F.W. Maitland noted long
ago that in England the church, the stock exchange, the legal
profession, the insurance market, and even the Jockey Club had
adopted various forms of self-regulation including machinery for
arbitrating disputes among members.  More recent research on
178
norms focuses on ways in which “private, closely knit, homogeneous
micro-societies can create their own norms that at times trump state
law and at other times fill lacuna in state regulation, but nonethe-
less operate autonomously.”  International civil society literature
179
recognizes that international trade association groups and their
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180. See FAIR LABOR ASS’N, W ORKPLACE CODE OF CONDUCT, available at http://www.
fairlabor.org/all/ code/index.html (providing a set of standards defining decent and humane
working conditions). But see Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, Enforcing International Labor
Standards: The Potential of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 203, 208
(2004) (discussing difficulties in holding private corporations to such codes). 
181. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 374-75 (2004) (noting the importance
of “private standard setting, accreditation, and certification plans by independent activists,
as well as monitoring by both nonprofits and for-profit consulting firms”).
182. Freeman, supra note 6, at 614 (citation omitted).
183. Id.
184. See Jill R. Horwitz, Why We Need the Independent Sector: The Behavior, Law, and
Ethics of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 50 UCLA L. REV. 1345, 1367, 1372-73 (2003); see also M.
BRYNA SANGER, THE W ELFARE MARKETPLACE: PRIVATIZATION AND W ELFARE REFORM 14-15,
65-71, 82-83 (2003) (making a similar argument about the benefits of using nonprofits in the
context of welfare privatization). But see Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the
Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1746-47 (2002) (expressing
skepticism that nonprofit status will have any significant disciplining effect on private welfare
contractors); Stevenson, supra note 142 (expressing same skepticism). 
private standard-setting bodies can wield tremendous influence in
creating voluntary standards that, in turn, become industry
norms.  
180
These codes of conduct can be created, monitored, and enforced
solely within an institution, industry, or profession, but they may be
enhanced through the intervention and oversight of outside
groups.  Within an industry, norms are most likely to develop and
181
become effective “when a professional group with its own standards
of excellence dominates the institution, as with doctors in
hospitals.”  By contrast, private nursing homes, run by low-wage
182
staff with high turnover rates, “lack a dominant professional group”
and are less effective.  In addition, whether an institution runs on
183
a for-profit or not-for-profit basis may have an impact on internal
culture. For example, in the health care context, one recent study
suggests that nonprofit hospitals provide more public goods and
services than for-profit institutions, possibly due to norms within
the nonprofit sector.  
184
Turning to external oversight, independent monitors can serve as
an important check that may serve to enhance internal modes of
accountability. For example, many state governments rely on a
private accrediting organization, the Joint Commission on Health
Care and Accreditation of Health Organizations (JCAHO), to set
licensure standards and certify that health care organizations are
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185. See Kinney, supra note 144, at 52.
186. See John K. Iglehart, The National Committee for Quality Assurance, 335 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 995, 997 (1996) (noting states that require health plans to be accredited by a
recognized external review body in order to maintain operating licenses). 
187. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29
U.S.C.).
188. See Troy A. Paredes, After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: The Future of the Mandatory
Disclosure System , 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 236 (2003) (noting that “Institutional Shareholder
Services, GovernanceMetrics International, Standard & Poor’s, and others have started
grading the corporate governance structures of companies, just as Standard & Poor’s or
Moody’s grade their debt”); see also Jenny Wiggins, S&P Outlines Ratings Overhaul in Light
of Enron, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2002, available at http://specials.ft.com/enron/FT3DYSS
OW W C.html (discussing changes in U.S. corporate governance and debt rating in the post-
Enron world). 
189. See Spiro, supra note 22, at 959 (detailing how interest groups, even “[w]here stymied
by national regulators ... can accomplish equivalent results by commanding consumer
preferences, which in turn works to constrain corporate or state behavior”).
190. See Choosing Your Fish with Care, W. MORNING NEWS (U.K.), Mar. 12, 2004, at 12
(reporting that “wall of death” nets regularly threatened dolphins a decade ago, but now
successful public awareness campaigns have led to changes in tuna fishing techniques, and
tuna manufacturers routinely label their tuna containers as “dolphin-friendly”). For a
discussion of the tuna-dolphin controversy as part of a consideration of the potential role of
unilateral trade sanctions in protecting environmental resources, see generally Richard W.
in compliance with those standards.  Similarly, the shift to185
managed care organizations to provide health care services under
Medicaid has increased governmental reliance on private accredit-
ing organizations, such as the National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA), which evaluate and rate health care plans.
186
And while the governmental reforms incorporated into the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002  received most of the attention in the
187
wake of the scandal surrounding Enron Corporation, changes
involving the way corporate debt is rated by Moody’s and Standard
& Poor’s (both private corporations) may be even more significant
over the long term.  
188
External monitoring can also be less direct, as when NGOs
mobilize consumer pressure to influence changes in industry
behavior. For example, the international anti-apartheid movement
combined shareholder, consumer, and governmental action to
persuade many corporations, universities, and pension funds to
divest themselves of South African investments long before official
national sanctions were in place.  Since then, similar boycott
189
efforts have resulted in changes to tuna fishing practices so as to
protect dolphins,  a decision by the French government to suspend
190
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Parker, The Use and Abuse of Trade Leverage to Protect the Global Commons: What We Can
Learn from the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict, 12 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
191. See Greenpeace International Founder Dies in Car Crash, ENV’T NEWS SERVICE, Mar.
23, 2001, http://ens-newswire.com/ens/mar2001/2001-03-23-12.asp (crediting Greenpeace with
creating pressure that helped push the French government to end its nuclear testing
program).
192. See Allan Pulsipher & William Daniel IV, Onshore-only Platform Disposition Needs
Exceptions, OIL & GAS J., Jan. 15, 2001, at 64 (reporting that Shell’s decision to cancel its plan
for an “at-sea disposition” of an oil rig followed an unexpectedly fierce campaign featuring
public boycotts).
193. Multinationals and Their Morals, ECONOMIST, Dec. 2, 1995, at 18.
194. W alter Otto Weyrauch & Maureen Anne Bell, Autonomous Lawmaking: The Case of
the “Gypsies,” 103 YALE L.J. 323, 330 (1993).
195. See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 57-59 (1968) (arguing that the act of
interpretation permits courts to adjust official legal norms to match custom or usage); James
W illard Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry in
W isconsin 1836-1915, at 289-94 (1964) (describing ways in which local norms in Wisconsin
lumber industry played a significant role in the way contract law was applied).
196. See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the
M erchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 503-19 (1987) (describing Karl Llewellyn’s initial
drafts of what later became Article 2 of the Uniform  Commercial Code).
its nuclear testing program,  and alterations in Shell Oil Corpora-191
tion’s decommissioning of a rig in the North Atlantic.  As The
192
Economist has observed, “a multinational’s failure to look like a
good global citizen is increasingly expensive in a world where
consumers and pressure groups can be quickly mobilised behind a
cause.”
193
Finally, official governmental bodies can draw upon internal
norms in establishing more formal methods of oversight. As scholars
have recognized, “[d]ecisionmakers work under a continuing
pressure to incorporate customary rules into their decisions.”  A
194
statute may be interpreted (or even supplanted) by reference to
industry custom,  or an entire legal regime—such as the Uniform
195
Commercial Code—may be adopted to codify industry practice.
196
Likewise, in the prison reform cases of the 1960s and 1970s, federal
courts used the American Correctional Association (ACA) manual
of professional conduct as a resource for establishing correctional
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197. See Robert Lilly & Paul Knepper, The Corrections-Commercial Complex, 39 CRIME &
DELINQ. 150, 161 (1993). But see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 544 n.27 (1979) (noting that
ACA standards do not themselves establish a constitutional minimum for cruel and unusual
punishment under the Eighth Amendment). For further discussion of the relationship
between ACA standards and judicial decisions concerning prison reform, see MALCOLM M.
FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE
COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 163 (1998).
198. See, e.g., DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 43-67 (2000) (discussing the limited ability of professional culture to police lawyer
misconduct). 
199. See, e.g., Pagnattaro, supra note 180, at 208-09 (expressing skepticism concerning
efficacy of apparel industry’s fair labor standards).
200. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 6, at 612 (noting concerns arising from the policymaking
nature of the Joint Com mission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO)
accreditation). Indeed, standard-setting bodies such as the American Correctional Association
(ACA) have been criticized because their officials are themselves often correctional officials,
thereby “creating a common sympathy and sense of purpose that tells against tougher
standards and more rigorous enforcement.” Dolovich, supra note 3 (manuscript at 28).
Moreover, Dolovich argues that because the institutions pay for accreditation, thereby
“providing income on which the ACA is dependent for its survival,” a high degree of capture
is likely. Id.
standards.  Compliance with internal standards can also be made197
a prerequisite for receiving government contracts.
Of course, this sort of compliance monitoring (both internal and
external)—like the modes of accountability already discussed—is
likely to be imperfect,  and institutional culture will never fully
198
discipline egregious behavior.  Oversight is often lax, parties may
199
hide behavior from auditors or internal monitors, supervisors may
actually look the other way even while purporting to enforce
institutional norms, and so on. Moreover, if it is left to private
standard-setting bodies to give content to the applicable norms, the
process could both dilute the norms and reduce public participation
in their development.  To say that an accountability mechanism is
200
imperfect, however, is not to say that it has no significant impact.
Especially given that all accountability mechanisms have limita-
tions, it would be foolish to ignore institutional accountability,
particularly in an era of privatization. Accordingly, attention must
be paid to the institutional settings of privatized action. 
*   *   *   * 
In the end, the domestic administrative law context provides a
more systematic series of operative norms and possible accountabil-
ity mechanisms than is typically found in the international law
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201. See infra Part III.B.2.
literature. Moreover, by using this framework of norms and mech-
anisms, international law scholars can analyze privatization as a
phenomenon, rather than simply discuss how to extend interna-
tional legal norms to specific categories of non-state actors. It may
be that, at least in some cases, privatization does not result in
decreased accountability, at least when accountability is thought of
in this broader way.
Of course, not all of the norms or mechanisms apply in precisely
the same way when considering privatization in the international
sphere. For example, the idea of democratic accountability must
be reconceptualized when the affected population is not the same
as the population whose government is providing the relevant
service.  Nevertheless, this framework allows us to think more
201
comprehensively about how best to articulate the relevant govern-
mental norms we seek to protect when we encounter privatization
and to recognize the variety of possible accountability mechanisms
that might be used. Only through such a comprehensive approach
can we evaluate the true effects of privatization on the international
and transnational system.
III. TWO CASE STUDIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRIVATIZATION
This Part uses the categories of norms and accountability
mechanisms just discussed to analyze privatization in both the
military and foreign aid contexts. Drawing on the domestic adminis-
trative law literature, I have laid out a framework of analysis that
I think will help us better assess the problem as well as point
the way toward solutions. Thus, I will evaluate the problem of
privatization by considering, in each context, its impact on legal,
democratic, contractual, and internal institutional accountability.
Where possible, I will compare the impact of privatization on the
relevant foreign affairs function of government with the impact on
a roughly analogous domestic function. Such comparisons, which
help highlight both the similarities and differences in various types
of domestic and foreign affairs privatization, produce at least three
important observations.
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202. I am using the term “legal accountability” to refer to a wide variety of forms of legal
redress, including domestic criminal trials and civil suits brought under both dom estic and
international law, as well as criminal proceedings and state-to-state complaints in
international fora. In each case, the individual or entity is, of course, being held accountable
to a different community or group of communities under different legal standards.
Nonetheless, the important point is that there would be some form of legal accountability
somewhere. Moreover, by grouping all forms of legal accountability together, we can more
easily draw contrasts between this form of accountability and other, less court-centered
approaches such as democratic participation, contractual liability, and internal institutional
sanctions.
First, although privatization in the international sphere elimi-
nates certain potential avenues of legal accountability,  such
202
consequences may not be as dramatic as we might at first assume
because the baseline of accountability for state actors in the
international system is already so low. In short, because interna-
tional law is already weakly enforced, the transition from state to
non-state actors may not affect the degree of accountability. Though
we surely should be concerned about weak international enforce-
ment in general, the specific phenomenon of privatization does not
make the legal accountability problem substantially worse than it
already is. Moreover, the few courts that have interpreted the state
action doctrine in the international context have tended to do so
quite broadly. As a result, in international and transnational cases,
courts will often treat a private actor as sufficiently tied to the state
to implicate norms against government conduct. Ordinary tort suits
might also be available against private actors, who will be less able
to take advantage of governmental immunities under international
law. For these reasons, private actors may actually face greater
legal accountability than state actors do under international law. 
Second, in the realm of democratic accountability, administrative
law scholars have much to teach international law scholars, but at
the same time the limits of the domestic and international analogy
become apparent. As noted previously, democratic accountability,
and the means of ensuring it in the face of agency and privatized
governmental action, has been one of the central preoccupations of
domestic administrative law. Domestically, there is, at least
theoretically, a democratic check on governmental action; if people
are unhappy about the way a governmental act affects them, they
can vote or lobby their representatives in order to effectuate change.
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As a result, there is a potential feedback loop between government
and the governed. Citizens have both a substantive right to the
rational, nonarbitrary administration of government programs and
a vehicle to enforce that right through the democratic process.
The idea of democratic accountability is more problematic when
states project power overseas because multiple relevant polities
are affected. With respect to the members of the polity that is acting
overseas, there is no question that they possess democratic
entitlements and can exercise them. But their willingness and
ability to do so is muted even without privatization. If the U.S.
government acts abroad, for example, U.S. citizens retain the ability
to respond through democratic mechanisms, but they are less likely
to use such mechanisms because the activities at issue may have
little impact in the United States, and transparency rules tend not
to apply as readily. Thus, while privatization may further limit the
possibilities of democratic participation, as in the case of legal
accountability it does not necessarily result in as steep reduction of
accountability as in analogous domestic contexts.  
With respect to those who do not belong to the democratic polity
exercising its power overseas, it is at best unclear whether they
even possess any democratic entitlements from that polity, such as
the right to rational, nonarbitrary, non-corrupt services from a
foreign government. There is thus an important threshold debate
about whether democratic norms apply. Certainly a strong case
can be made that they do, but in that case, privatization will not
dramatically reduce non-citizens’ ability to influence foreign
governments’ policies. Indeed, privatization may actually yield
alternative modes of democratic participation, through the vehicles
of contract and internal institutional accountability discussed below.
Third, by studying domestic administrative law scholarship on
privatization, we may come to devote more attention to the possibil-
ity of using contractual agreements and internal institutional
mechanisms to impose a measure of accountability on private
actors. Though the use of agreements is certainly not a panacea,
contracts are an under-explored tool for enforcing public law norms
when the international functions of government are transferred
to private actors. Likewise, the internal institutional culture of
organizations can have a strong impact on accountability.
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203. To be sure, U.S. military contractors are not permitted to perform direct combat roles.
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fighter planes, tanks, and other weaponry during combat or providing security for airports
and other facilities, place contractors very close to battle lines. Many battlefield contractors
providing ancillary services are even entitled to carry weapons for self-defense. See ARMY
MATERIEL COMMAND, PAMPHLET NO. 715-18, AMC CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTORS SUPPORTING
MILITARY OPERATIONS 19-1 (2000), available at http://www.amc.army.mil/amc/ci/pubs/p715_
18.pdf. Military prison interrogators wield enormous control over detainees subject to
interrogation. 
204. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Private Parties as Defendants in Civil Rights Litigation:
Introduction, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 7 (2004); Singer, Vacuum of Law , supra note 23, at 525;
Joanne Mariner, Private Contractors Who Torture, CNN, June 17, 2004, at http://www.cnn.
A. Military Functions
As discussed in Part I, the United States, other governments, and
international organizations are increasingly contracting with
private actors to perform a range of military functions, from logistics
support on the battlefield, to tactical advising, to interrogation and
detention services, to, in some cases, actual combat. While military
contractors are susceptible to abuses under all three categories of
norms that are the focus of this Article—norms of human dignity,
norms against corruption and fraud, and norms of rational,
nonarbitrary provision of services—the possibility that military
contractors could infringe on the human dignity of those they
encounter in the field is a particular concern because of the powers
they wield.  This Part will therefore focus primarily on the impact
203
of privatization on potential violations of human dignity norms,
though it will make passing references to other norms where
applicable. In addition, because of the serious and extensive nature
of the abuses committed by private contractors at Abu Ghraib, I will
use this incident as a point of departure and compare it to the
roughly analogous domestic example of private prisons. 
1. Legal Accountability
Most commentators who have taken note of the increase in
military contracting and the potential for contractors to violate the
human dignity of those within their control have emphasized the
lack of legal remedies for contractor abuse.  While it is true that
204
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or degrading treatment; or war crim es. See Torture Convention, supra note 70, at arts. 1, 16;
Civilians Convention, supra note 111, at art. 147; ICC Statute, supra note 98, at arts. 7(2)(a),
8. The acts might also constitute crimes against humanity, if the abuses were “widespread or
systematic” and committed “pursuant to ... a State or organizational policy.” Id. at art. 7. In
addition, the acts alleged would likely constitute offenses under U.S. law, which directly
prohibits the international crimes of torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2000), and war crimes, 18
U.S.C. § 2241 (2000), and which also criminalizes assault, murder, manslaughter, and
maiming. Finally, the acts are crimes under Iraqi law. Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 7 § 2 (June 10, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/index.
html#Orders (adding prohibition on torture and cruel and inhuman treatment to Iraqi
crim inal code), and U.S. military law. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 893 (2000) (forbidding “cruelty and
maltreatment”).
the avenues for legal redress in such cases are limited, this critique
tends to miss the deeper point, that, at least when compared to the
very few legal remedies available for government actors, the loss in
remedies for private actors is actually not that great. Indeed, in
some cases, more avenues of legal redress may exist in the interna-
tional setting against private actors than against public ones. 
At Abu Ghraib, U.S. military personnel responsible for detention
operations abused detainees by forcing them to strip and undergo
acts of sexual humiliation, threatening them with dogs, applying
electric shocks, subjecting them to mock executions, exposing them
to severely cold weather, beating them, nearly suffocating them,
and, in some cases, killing them.  Private employees operating
205
under contract with the Department of the Interior as interrogators
and translators participated in the abuse alongside uniformed
military personnel and reportedly directed some of the activities.
206
Such abuses clearly violated multiple norms embodied in both
international and domestic law.  Despite the magnitude of these
207
violations, however, the avenues for legal redress, even against the
governmental actors, are extremely limited. First, there are few, if
any, international, Iraqi, or transnational venues in which the
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208. Unless the Security Council authorizes a case to proceed, the ICC may exercise
jurisdiction only when either the state in which the alleged crime occurred or the state of the
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12(2). Neither the United States nor Iraq has consented to jurisdiction. See Rome Statute
Ratification Status, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
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209. Under the complementarity regime, the ICC may not consider a case if a state with
jurisdiction is investigating or prosecuting the case, unless that state is “unwilling or unable
genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” ICC Statute, supra note 98, at art.
17. 
210. ICCPR, supra note 107, at arts. 28-45. Iraq and the United States have both ratified
the ICCPR. See OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS NEW YORK, DECEMBER 16 1966,
http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/ 4.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2005).
211. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 776 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston
eds., 2d ed. 2000) (noting that no interstate complaint has ever been brought under any of the
UN treaty-body procedures). 
212. See COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, ORDER 17, STATUS OF THE COALITION
PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, MNF, CERTAIN MISSIONS AND PERSONNEL IN IRAQ, § 2,
http://www.iraqcoa lition .org /regu lations /20040627_C P A O R D _17_S tatus_of_C oalition
__Rev__with_Annex_A.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2005) (“Unless provided otherwise herein,
the MNF, the CPA, Foreign Liaison Missions, their Personnel, property, funds and assets, and
all International Consultants shall be immune from  Iraqi legal process.”).
governmental actors or entities could be held criminally or civilly
liable. The International Criminal Court has no jurisdiction over
Iraq,  and, even if it did, under the complementarity principle any
208
domestic investigation or prosecution would defeat jurisdiction.
209
No other international criminal tribunal has jurisdiction, either.
Iraq could theoretically bring a complaint against the United States
before the Human Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body
charged with monitoring implementation of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  State-to-state complaints
210
in such a venue are extraordinarily rare,  however, and it seems
211
unlikely that, given Iraq’s continuing dependence on U.S. support
and aid, the Iraqi government would risk souring that relationship
by bringing such a complaint at any point in the near future. A suit
in the International Court of Justice, while conceivable, is unlikely
for the same reason. With regard to Iraqi courts, although criminal
or civil proceedings could theoretically be brought locally, the U.S.
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) granted immunity to U.S.
and other foreign actors in Iraq.  It is, of course, an open question
212
whether such an immunity provision can effectively shield individu-
als from accusations of gross human rights violations. Regardless,
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available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/German_COMPLAINT_
English_Version.pdf (last visited May 18, 2005).
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11, 2005, at A9. 
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217. See id.
218. At the highest levels, of course, head-of-state and diplomatic immunities might apply.
See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belg.), 2002 I.C.J. 121,
para. 78 (Feb. 14, 2002).
219. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340, 2340A, 2340B (2000).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2000).
the Iraqi legal system is not in any condition to consider such
cases.  Finally, the prospects of a transnational suit in a third-
213
party state under principles of universal jurisdiction are also slim.
For example, though a group of Abu Ghraib victims filed an action
for war crimes in Germany under that country’s universal jurisdic-
tion statute,  the statute requires approval from the chief German
214
prosecutor before jurisdiction can be exercised, and the prosecutor
recently declined to move forward with the case,  most likely
215
because of its politically sensitive nature.
The best options for legal accountability, therefore, are domestic.
There has been some accountability within the U.S. military justice
system. Thus far, seven enlisted soldiers have entered guilty pleas,
one soldier was convicted following a military trial, and one trial is
still pending.  These are fairly low-level actors, however, and their
216
sentences have all been relatively short, ranging from no time at all
to ten years in prison.  And though the military has also conducted
217
some informal investigations, there has been no accountability at
higher levels, despite suggestions that responsibility may lead
further up the chain of command.  Thus far no criminal or civil
218
cases have been brought in U.S. civilian courts, though such options
are available at least in theory. Criminal prosecutions could also be
initiated under U.S. statutes that criminalize torture  and war
219
crimes  committed outside the United States. However, in light of
220
the administration’s reluctance either to characterize the Abu
Ghraib abuse as torture or to set a precedent for prosecutions of war
crimes in civilian courts, such prosecutions are unlikely. Indeed,
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223. See Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763,
794 (1950).
224. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000).
225. For example, suits arising from any discretionary function are barred, even if the
government officials in question abused their discretion. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000). 
226. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248 (1960) (prohibiting
military jurisdiction over civilian dependents in time of peace, regardless of whether the
offense was capital or noncapital); Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U .S. 278, 280 (1960) (holding
civilian employees committing capital offenses not am enable to military jurisdiction); McElroy
v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U .S. 281, 283-84 (1960) (expanding Grisham  to
even though the acts of abuse may violate other federal laws for
which military personnel can be held responsible, the administra-
tion may well be reluctant to prosecute such cases. Civil suits could
be brought against U.S. government actors under international law
using the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA),  but such suits are
221
usually brought against noncitizens and are less likely to succeed
against U.S. military personnel.  Avenues of relief under domestic
222
law are similarly confined. It is at best uncertain whether the
Constitution applies extraterritorially,  and though the Federal
223
Tort Claims Act  may waive sovereign immunity for some domestic
224
tort suits, such waiver is quite limited.  
225
Viewed against this backdrop, the possibility of legal accountabil-
ity for private actors, either individuals or corporations, does not
seem significantly worse. While there are added hurdles for such
actors in some settings, in others there is actually a greater
likelihood of legal accountability. Certainly there is again no
international court or tribunal that would be likely to exercise
jurisdiction, but, as discussed above, that is no different than for
governmental actors. Similarly, Iraqi courts are an unlikely venue
both because of the possible applicability of the CPA immunity
provision and because of the undeveloped state of the current Iraqi
legal system—but these courts would be equally unavailable for
proceedings against governmental actors. 
Domestically, it is true that the military justice system is not
available to try the non-state actors, as the U.S. Supreme Court has
prohibited military trials of U.S. civilians absent a declaration of
war.  Yet, domestic criminal prosecutions in civilian courts may be
226
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228. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (MEJA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-3267
(2000).
229. See USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 804 (amending 18 U.S.C. § 7).
230. See Farah Stockman, CIA Contractor Is Charged in Beating of Afghan Detainee,
BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 2004, at A1.
more likely than such prosecutions of governmental actors. To be
sure, prosecutions under the War Crimes Act or the statute
criminalizing extraterritorial torture are unlikely for the same
reasons that prosecutions of governmental actors are unlikely
under these statutes: because the administration appears reluctant
to characterize the abuses at Abu Ghraib as torture or to set a
precedent for domestic civilian prosecution under these provisions.
Moreover, prosecutors applying these statutes would need to show
a sufficient nexus between the contractors and the governmental
actors to establish state action (though this may not be a particu-
larly onerous burden in this context).  Nevertheless, prosecution
227
under ordinary domestic criminal law, which forbids the acts
committed at Abu Ghraib even if not characterizing them as torture,
is a real possibility. The Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act,
which was enacted precisely because U.S. military courts are not an
option for private actors, specifically allows criminal charges to be
brought against U.S. contractors working for the Defense Depart-
ment.  Of course, because many of the contractors in Iraq are
228
operating under agreements with the CIA or with the Department
of Interior, the statute would not apply in all cases. The USA
PATRIOT Act, however, closes this loophole to some extent by
expanding the United States’ special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction (SMTJ) to include facilities run by the United States
overseas.  Thus, a prosecutor might bring charges against private
229
actors mistreating detainees overseas if the abuse constitutes a
crime within the SMTJ as long as the crime was committed within
a U.S. facility. In fact, one private contractor who was working for
the CIA and was implicated in detainee abuse in Afghanistan has
been indicted in the United States for assault committed within the
SMTJ.  
230
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233. See Danner & Martinez, supra note 122, at 103.
234. See generally TORTURE AS TORT: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT
OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION (Craig Scott ed., 2001).  
On the civil side, a number of possibilities also exist. A civil suit
under the ATCA already has been filed against the contractors
implicated at Abu Ghraib for violations of international law.
231
Because it has been brought against private parties, the suit will
need to demonstrate a link to state action, at least with respect to
the claims of torture and other norms that require such a link.
However, in the Abu Ghraib setting such a link may not be so
difficult to establish because the private contractors were working
in a facility actually run by the U.S. government. To be sure, there
is some ambiguity as to whether the uniformed personnel were
taking orders from the contractors or vice versa. Yet, under even the
narrow construction of the state action doctrine found in U.S.
constitutional law, or, alternatively, under a theory of joint criminal
action, the activities at Abu Ghraib would probably be actionable.
If the prison were managed entirely by private contractors, show-
ing a nexus to the state would be more difficult. But while U.S.
courts have imported the state action doctrine from U.S. constitu-
tional law to use in ATCA cases, they have applied the doctrine in
a much broader way than they have in ordinary domestic suits.
232
International courts have also tended to apply theories of complic-
ity, such as joint criminal enterprise, quite broadly.  Thus, in the
233
international context, even where private actors wield considerable
discretion to manage detention facilities, it is not nearly as difficult
to demonstrate a sufficient link to the state. 
Finally, an under-explored avenue is the extent to which ordinary
municipal law, such as tort law, might provide norms that could be
used to address human rights abuses like those committed at Abu
Ghraib.  For example, assault or battery in the law of many
234
countries would cover the same conduct that would give rise to a
torture claim. In many suits brought under the Alien Tort Claims
Act in the United States, plaintiffs assert state law tort claims
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239. Cf. Jama v. Esm or Corr. Servs., Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 662, 688-89 (D.N.J. 2004)
(rejecting government contractor defense for tort claims against private prison management
corporation because contract did not specifically require or approve of corporation practices
that led to abuse).
240. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For example in 2001, prisoners initiated approximately 22,800
under a theory of pendant jurisdiction.  But such claims might also235
be asserted directly. Just as transnational tort cases can sometimes
be brought in areas such as products liability, so too human rights
suits might take the form of a transnational tort. 
To be sure, for cases brought in the United States, contractors
might argue that, in addition to immunities under the CPA, they
should get the benefit of the so-called “government contractor
defense,” the immunity given to governmental actors under the
FTCA.  There is, however, at least a plausible argument that
236
immunity should not apply to these types of claims. The case that
establishes this doctrine, Boyle v. United Technologies, Inc.,
237
involved a products liability claim (not a claim regarding a services
contract) and in any event limited the defense to circumstances in
which the government set the design specifications with reasonable
precision, leaving little discretion to the contractor. At least one
court has concluded that the defense does not apply to international
human rights claims.  For domestic claims arising from tort and
238
contract, an argument could be made that because the government
contracts for services at Abu Ghraib prison were not particularly
specific, the contractor should not be able to invoke immunity.  In
239
any event, it is clear that when the government privatizes military
functions, individuals seeking redress may actually have more
avenues to pursue legal accountability than when the government
performs military functions directly.  
The roughly analogous example of domestic prison abuse provides
an instructive comparison. Prisoners who are victims of abuse in
state-run prisons can bring suits under the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, using either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
governmental actors, or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.  To be sure, courts have in recent
240
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years tended to restrict such claims by interpreting the scope of
substantive rights more and more narrowly, and procedural hurdles
on prisoners bringing such claims have grown as well.  Yet in
241
egregious cases, such suits remain a viable option, and while
government officials do have the benefit of qualified immunity, this
is a burden that can be overcome in clear instances of abuse.
242
Criminal prosecution is also a possibility. Thus, the baseline of legal
accountability for governmental actors is far more robust than in
the international context, and the risk of loss in accountability due
to privatization is correspondingly potentially much greater. Indeed,
when prison privatization took hold in its most recent incarna-
tion in the 1980s and 1990s, critics initially raised concerns that
prisoners might lose opportunities to redress abuses in court
because private prison employees might not qualify as state actors,
thereby making most constitutional and many statutory claims
inapplicable.  
243
It is true that some of those fears have proven to be overblown.
Most domestic courts have now concluded that private prison
personnel are state actors for constitutional purposes and act
under color of law thereby permitting § 1983 suits.  Indeed,
244
private prison personnel may in fact face greater legal liability
than government personnel, because the U.S. Supreme Court has
concluded that private prison guards are not subject to immunity.
245
These guards are therefore more exposed both to suits seeking to
vindicate constitutional norms and to ordinary tort suits.
246
Accordingly, the domestic example of prison privatization demon-
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prison context may nevertheless pose serious problems for other reasons. Dolovich, supra note
3 (arguing that profit motive will put pressures on private prison operators to treat inmates
less humanely than governmental prison operators).
248. See supra Part II.B.1.
strates that privatization does not intrinsically pose as great a risk
to legal accountability as critics initially feared.
247
Yet, there can be little doubt that constitutional checks on the
behavior of state actors are far more robust than are the correspond-
ing international law instruments. Moreover, in nearly every other
domestic context courts have not been as willing to interpret the
state action doctrine expansively and have therefore refused to
consider employees of corporations under contract with the govern-
ment to be state actors.  Thus, domestic privatization does in fact
248
present a real loss of accountability most of the time.
In contrast, as we have seen, the opportunity for holding military
actors accountable under international law is extremely limited.
And although the lack of legal accountability for official military
personnel and government officials is certainly not cause for
celebration, it does mean that the risk of loss in legal accountability
due to privatization will generally not be as great in the interna-
tional setting as critics fear. Especially if courts are willing to apply
an expansive interpretation of what counts as state action (just as
U.S. courts have in the prison context and in ATCA cases so far),
private actors may actually face greater legal accountability than
governmental actors do under international law. In addition, as
discussed below, privatization may also open up alternative modes
of accountability.
2. Democratic Accountability
Privatization of military functions undoubtedly helps insulate
these functions from public scrutiny and oversight, at least to some
degree. Indeed, this reduced accountability may well be a principal
reason that governmental actors seek to privatize in the first place.
For example, President Clinton was able to intervene in Kosovo to
halt ethnic cleansing in part because he used so many private
contractors in supporting roles and therefore risked fewer troop
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deaths. KBR’s contract alone reduced troop supply in the Balkans
by an estimated 8,900.  Had more American troops been deployed
249
(not to mention injured or killed), it would have been far more
difficult to build and maintain public support for the military
engagement. In Iraq, the increased use of private contractors has
also dramatically reduced the U.S. military casualty figure, again
with important political consequences. In addition, private military
contracts between U.S. companies and foreign governments,
negotiated with the blessing of the U.S. government, can allow the
U.S. government to circumvent international prohibitions without
inviting as much public scrutiny. For example, the U.S. encouraged
MPRI to enter into contracts with Croatia and Sri Lanka during
periods when those countries were ineligible to receive official U.S.
military assistance.  In a somewhat analogous context, reports
250
suggest that, in the so-called “war on terror,” U.S. authorities may
be farming out interrogation tasks to other governments known to
use abusive tactics that would be politically or legally problematic
if undertaken by U.S. military personnel.  
251
Oversight is also reduced because there is less transparency. For
example, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) does not apply to
the actions of private contractors.  Although FOIA does permit the
252
public to request information about the terms of contracts, the
contractors essentially have a veto over the release of contract terms
if they contain “trade secrets and commercial or financial informa-
tion obtained from a person and [are] privileged or confidential.”
253
Thus, in many cases, the terms of the contracts are not publicly
available. Even worse, the process by which contracts are awarded
is not an open one. For example, many of the most significant Iraq
contracts were awarded on a “no-bid” basis.
254
2005] GOVERNMENT FOR HIRE 193
255. See Nicole Cásarez, Furthering the Accountability Principle in Privatized Federal
Corrections: The Need for Access to Private Prison Records, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 249, 268-
91 (1995); see also J. Michael Keating, Jr., Public over Private: Monitoring the Performance
of Privately Operated Prisons and Jails, in PRIVATE PRISONS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 130,
132-54 (Douglas C. MacDonald ed., 1990) (describing mechanisms for oversight of private
prisons).
256. Cásarez, supra note 255, at 270.
257. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552; 551-559; 701-706 (2000).
258. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: PRISONERS IN 2003 6-7 (Nov. 2004), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/p03.pdf (charting populations in private facilities in each state but
excluding private prison populations in data such as overcrowding).
259. See generally Cásarez, supra note 255, at 268-91 (discussing the lack of transparency
as a result of prison privitization).
260. Id.
Nevertheless, the effect of privatization in the domestic context
is potentially far greater because, again, the baseline is different.
For example, democratic accountability over privately run prisons
is dramatically lower than over publicly run facilities.  FOIA,
255
which is far more robust in the domestic setting than in the
international sphere, simply does not apply to private actors.
256
Likewise, many of the other legal rules designed to increase
transparency in addition to FOIA—the APA’s judicial review
provisions, and other so-called “sunshine laws”—do not apply to
privately managed programs.  Particularly if the contractor is a
257
privately-held corporation, there may be very little publicly
available information about its activities. For example, the annual
report on prison populations issued by the U.S. Department of
Justice provides extensive information about the number of people
incarcerated and addresses various prison management questions,
but does not include data on the number of inmates held in
privatized facilities.  In addition, the awarding of contracts is
258
decided by the executive branch, with no independent deliberative
process and little or no involvement from legislative officials.
259
Moreover, management and oversight decisions are increasingly
being delegated to the private actors themselves.  There is thus
260
less control by legislatures, leaving the public yet another step
removed from the policy process. 
Privatizing military functions, in contrast, will be unlikely to
make quite so big a difference in the amount of democratic oversight
because even those military operations that are not privatized can
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41 (2004). 
265. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 82-83, 110 (2d
ed. 1997); see also Tobias T. Gibson et al., The Absence of the Sacred: Democracy in the Age of
Militarism , 2003 J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 28, 28 (2003) (arguing that legislative control over
military policy has decreased, in part due to fragmented oversight of large number of
congressional com m ittees). See generally HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990) (examining the role
of Congress in decision making regarding national security). 
266. Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified as am ended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 et
evade many transparency norms. To begin with, the APA judicial
review provisions do not apply to the activities of the Defense
Department,  so there is nothing lost on that score when functions
261
are privatized. With respect to FOIA, even though requests can be
made in order to gather information about military programs, such
requests can be and often are refused under FOIA’s national
security exemption.  Such refusals can be reviewed by a court,
262
such as in the recent case where a judge granted a FOIA request
seeking information about the treatment of military detainees at
Guantanamo naval base and elsewhere.  FOIA may, nonetheless,
263
have less utility with respect to military actions than with respect
to actions, say, in the domestic prison context. In addition, official
government policies about media access during wartime, coupled
with internal media conventions and practical limitations on
overseas wartime reporting, mean that government actions in the
military sector, particularly during wartime, are likely to receive
less media scrutiny than domestic security activities.
264
In addition, even without privatization, the legislative branch
exercises far less oversight and control over military operations
than over domestic law enforcement and prison operations. While
the Constitution gives Congress a role in foreign affairs generally
and military affairs specifically through the power of the purse, as
well as the power to declare war and scrutinize executive branch
policies, Congress often has not exercised these powers in a robust
way.  For example, Congress has been unwilling to insist on
265
obedience to the War Powers Resolution  in armed conflicts from
266
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seq. (1988)). 
267. See HENKIN, supra note 265, at 110 (“[T]he Congress has not acted to secure Executive
compliance [with the War Powers Resolution]—by new legislation, by exerting its power over
the national purse, or by threat of impeachment.”).
268. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, Covert Operations, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 795, 797 (1989).
269. 50 U.S.C. §§ 413-415 (2000).
270. For example, see the Boland Am endments, enacted as part of the Intelligence
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-215, § 108, 97 Stat. 1473, 1475 (1983);
Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775,
97 Stat. 1421, 1452 (1983) (restricting U.S. aid to the Contras in Nicaragua); 22 U.S.C. § 2414
(2000) (requiring President to report on military sales and foreign assistance).
271. 50 U.S.C. §§ 413-414 (2000) (allowing confidential reports to congressional committees
of intelligence activities, anticipated activities, and the financing of intelligence activities). 
272. “Executive failure to abide by congressional restrictions led to the Iran-Contra scandal
in 1987-89.” See HENKIN, supra note 265, at 112.
273. Cf. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 10 STAN. L. REV. 953, 957 (2002) (arguing that “[i]n the
wake of September 11, citizens and their elected representatives have repeatedly chosen to
sacrifice the liberties of noncitizens in furtherance of the citizenry’s purported security ...
[b]ecause noncitizens have no vote, and thus no direct voice in the democratic process” and
are therefore “a particularly vulnerable minority.”).
Grenada to Iraq.  Moreover, even the War Powers Resolution267
exempts from its strictures covert activities overseas,  which are
268
governed by the less onerous requirements of the Intelligence
Oversight Act  and related statutes.  Although this regime
269 270
requires agencies to report to Congress, congressional scrutiny in
this area is likely to involve secret committee hearings and reports
not open to the broader public, further reducing transparency and
broader democratic accountability.  And even then, agencies do not
271
always fulfill their reporting obligations under these statutes.
272
Finally, comparing military privatization with privatization of
domestic security functions such as prisons reveals perhaps the
most crucial distinction of all. Democratic accountability over
military activities is vastly reduced, whether performed by govern-
mental actors or by contractors, because many of the populations
affected by our military activities are not U.S. citizens. Although the
projection of U.S. military power may have profound consequences
for these noncitizens and their societies, they cannot vote or make
financial contributions to U.S. political parties.  To be sure, in the
273
domestic context, many of the individuals affected by prison policy
also do not have much of a voice. Inmates generally cannot vote and
often face restrictions on participation in the democratic process
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274. Forty-eight states and the District of Columbia do not allow inmates convicted of a
felony to vote while incarcerated. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT
LAWS IN THE U NITED STATES, http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf (last visited
Sept. 20, 2005). Thirty-five states prohibit felons from voting while on parole and thirty-one
exclude felons on probation. Id. Once felons have completed their sentences, five states
continue to deny all ex-offenders the right to vote and nine others deny the right to some ex-
offenders. Id. In total, an estimated 4.7 million Americans currently cannot vote, either
temporarily or permanently, as a result of a felony conviction. Id.
275. See Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy:
Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371, 372 (2001) (describing increasing
influence of international NGOs and arguing that such influence lacks democratic legitimacy).
276. See generally NOAH FELDMAN, W HAT W E OWE IRAQ: W AR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING (2004) (arguing for special moral obligations owed to Iraq by the United States as
an occupying force).
277. Cf. Anderson, supra note 275, at 372-73 (assuming, in the context of arguing against
even once they are released.  At the same time, overseas popula-274
tions affected by the U.S. military can, to the extent that they live
in democracies, try to influence their political leaders to engage
diplomatically in ways that reflect their preferences. Alternatively,
they can support NGOs that critique U.S. policy.  Yet, the simple
275
fact that those affected by U.S. military policies tend to be living
abroad severely reduces the scope of democratic accountability. For
all of these reasons, we can see that the baseline of accountability
is already reduced in the international military context, making the
turn to privatization somewhat less significant.
However, even if privatizing military functions does not dramati-
cally reduce democratic accountability, the general lack of demo-
cratic accountability for military activities is troubling. Thus, we
need to consider the argument that the United States has a
democratic responsibility not only to its own citizens, but also, in
some circumstances, to noncitizens who are affected by the exercise
of U.S. power. That responsibility may not include extending the
right to vote, but could include lesser obligations such as providing
information or giving opportunities for participation and consulta-
tion. The responsibility may vary depending on the nature of
control—when the United States is an occupying power, for
example, the obligation may be far greater than when the United
States is constructing a military base in a friendly country.  To be
276
sure, the idea that the United States might have a democratic
obligation to noncitizens overseas is a controversial one.  But in
277
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the democratic legitimacy of NGOs, that individuals possess democratic entitlem ents only
within  a particular state or policy).
278. See HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO GROUND TRUTH, INVESTIGATING U.S. ABUSES
IN THE “W AR ON TERROR,” (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
us_law/PDF/detainees/Getting_to_Ground_Truth_090804.pdf [hereinafter GROUND TRUTH].
279. See Treatment of Iraqi Prisoners: Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th
Cong. (2004), at 2004 WL 1027359; Army Inspector General’s Report Regarding Prisoner Abuse
at Abu Ghraib: Hearing Before the S. Armed Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (2004), available at
2004 WL 1634057; Military Intelligence at Abu Ghraib Prison: Hearing Before the H. Armed
Servs. Comm., 106th Cong. (2004), available at 2004 WL 2030770.
280. See Letter from Gen. David M. Brahms (Ret. USMC) and retired U.S. Military Leaders
to President Bush (Sept. 8, 2004) (calling for independent and comprehensive commission to
investigate detainee abuse), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/
detainees/ Military_Leaders_Letter_President_ Bush_FINAL.pdf.
281. See TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 63; DAIG REPORT, supra note 205; FAY REPORT, supra
note 205; SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 205; Memorandum from Dep’t of Interior
Inspector Gen. to Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget, (July 16, 2004)
[hereinafter DOI Memo], available at http://www.oig.doi.gov/upload/CACI%20 LETTER3.pdf
(providing Review of 12 Procurements Placed Under Gen. Servs. Admin. Fed. Supply
Schedules 70 and 871 by the Nat’l Bus. Center); see also Dep’t of Defense, News Briefing,
Background Briefing on Investigations at Abu Ghraib (Aug. 25, 2004), at http://www.
defense.gov/transcripts/2004/tr20040825-1222.html (commenting on each investigation).
282. GROUND TRUTH, supra note 278, at 10.
any event the current lack of democratic oversight with regard to
either public or private actors engaging in military activities is
striking. 
For example, in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal there
has been far too little democratic accountability over either the
public or the private actors. Because the victims are noncitizens,
they have less clout within the democratic process, although human
rights groups have spoken out and lobbied on their behalf.
278
Congress has held hearings,  but it has not given the issue nearly
279
the degree of attention that it deserves and notably has failed to
establish an independent commission to investigate abuses, a step
that some have strongly recommended.  While the military has
280
itself initiated multiple investigations,  these inquiries were for
281
the most part narrowly focused on specific operational units on the
ground and therefore did not examine the role of high-level civilian
officials. As a result, they did not “look fully at the interaction of
military police and military intelligence, or the relationship between
these Army units and personnel from the CIA, civilian contractors,
special operations forces, and other agents in the field.”  Thus, as
282
described previously, there is little democratic accountability with
198 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
283. See supra note 279.
284. See Agreement Between the Departm ent of the Interior and CACI Premier
Technology, Inc., No. NBCHA010005 (2000) [hereinafter DOI-CACI], available at http://www.
publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/CACI_ordersAll.pdf. 
285. Several of the reports noted that the contract interrogators participated in or failed
to report abuse of detainees. See FAY REPORT, supra note 205, at 131-35; TAGUBA REPORT,
supra note 63, at 48. Som e of the reports also em phasized that many of the contract
employees had received no training in U.S. military doctrine or interrogation techniques. See
DAIG REPORT, supra note 205, at vi, 87-89; SCHLESINGER REPORT, supra note 205, at 69; FAY
REPORT, supra note 205, at 47-52. One report concluded that the military had “no training to
fall back on in the management, control, and discipline of these personnel.” FAY REPORT,
supra  note 205, at 19. These reports, however, did not focus extensively on the civilian
contractors, and the Department of Interior report focused primarily on problems in the
contracting process, rather than on ways in which the contract terms and structures could
have helped to prevent abuse of detainees. DOI Memo, supra note 281.
286. Many articles have, of course, been written about the role of private contractors in the
abuse. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 204; Ellen McCarthy, Interior Dept. Inquiry Faults
Procurement, W ASH. POST, July 17, 2004, at E3.
regard to the actual military personnel, let alone the private
contractors. 
To be sure, privatization does exacerbate some of the failures of
democratic accountability. Thus, for example, the public hearings
that did take place concerning Abu Ghraib focused primarily on the
military personnel implicated, not the private contractors.
283
Relatedly, information about the scope of private involvement in the
abuse has been somewhat harder to obtain than information about
the involvement of uniformed military personnel. The contracts with
CACI and Titan, for example, were not awarded in an open bidding
process and only recently became available.  While some of the
284
executive branch internal reports have mentioned the problem of
contractor abuse in passing, none has thoroughly investigated the
role the contractors played in the abuse.  Similarly, while report-
285
ers have noted the involvement of private companies, stories have
tended to focus more on public actors.  Thus, private actors, even
286
in the military context, are at least a bit further below the radar
than are official military personnel.
Accordingly, in both the foreign and domestic settings more work
needs to be done to consider ways of replacing the feedback
mechanism that democratic accountability would ordinarily provide.
If a government program (whether administered directly or through
private contractors) affects people who for whatever reason have no
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287. See generally Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency-Cost Theory of Trust Law , 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 621, 623-32 (applying agency cost theory to trust law and arguing that trust law is better
suited to understanding three-way relationships than contract law).
way of responding or providing a check on governmental action, it
may make sense to build alternative mechanisms that would fulfill
a similar role. Such mechanisms may take the form of independent
ombudspersons, auditors, or tribunals whose job it would be to seek
out opinions from among affected populations. Or there may be
other ways to construct a process that would require consideration
of how the governmental (or privatized) action is actually working
on the ground. Indeed, we might conceive of the relationship as
similar to a trust, where the contractors are like trustees who must
take into account the interest of the beneficiaries and not just the
trust settlor.  Or NGOs might be given a greater oversight role. In
287
any event, this is an area that should be a focus of future interna-
tional legal scholarship, particularly in a world where transnational
activity is so common.
3. Contractual Accountability
We have seen that privatization of military functions does not
necessarily decrease the degree of accountability provided by formal
legal mechanisms or through the oversight of the democratic process
itself. Yet, that seemingly “good” news is achieved only by acknowl-
edging that there are shockingly few avenues of accountability over
even governmental actors. So, if one is concerned about ensuring
that there are at least some mechanisms by which private military
contractors can be held accountable for violating public law norms,
where can one turn? In the next two sections, I argue that contrac-
tual and institutional accountability provide two possibilities.
Turning to contractual accountability, examples involving domes-
tic privatization suggest that the government contracts themselves
can serve as a mode of accountability by including provisions that
require providers of government services to follow some or all of the
various laws and rules that would bind the corresponding govern-
ment actors. As a term in their contracts with privately run prisons,
for example, many states require compliance with constitutional,
federal, state, and private standards for prison operation and
200 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
288. See generally Keating, supra note 255, at 139 (detailing efforts to set standards for
acceptable correctional practice).
289. See, e.g., Okla. Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Services Contract, art. 5 [hereinafter
Oklahoma Contract], available at http://www.doc.state.ok.us/Private%20Prisons/98cnta.pdf
(last visited May 21, 2005).
290. Id. at arts. 6.3-6.4.
291. Id. at art. 5.19.
292. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 634-35 (describing contract between private corporation
and State of Texas).
293. Id. at 635-36.
294. Id. In some cases such contracts may already be a source of third-party beneficiary
rights. See Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1250 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding that federal prisoner
benefiting from contract between federal government and Nassau County may sue under
contract). 
inmates’ rights.  Contractors must also meet rigorous performance288
standards. Thus, under the model contract for private prison
management drafted by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections,
contractors must meet such standards for security, meals, and
education.  They must also certify that the training provided to
289
personnel is comparable to that for state employees  and conduct
290
“continuous self-monitoring,” using a comprehensive self-monitoring
plan approved by the Oklahoma Department of Corrections.  In
291
Texas, contractors must abide by similar terms and, in addition,
must “establish performance measures for rehabilitative programs
and develop a system to assess achievement and outcomes.”  
292
To be sure, incorporating public law norms and requiring self-
evaluation does not ensure compliance. The norms, despite being
fleshed out by performance standards, still remain open to interpre-
tation, and self-evaluation does not necessarily translate into
obedience to these norms. Commentators have suggested that these
practices could be enhanced by provisions that would require
monitoring either by a state-appointed contract manager and/or
independent third party groups, as well as public reporting require-
ments.  In addition, the contracts could allow for prisoners or other
293
interested groups to sue as third-party beneficiaries.   
294
Despite the imperfections of domestic contracting, it is far
superior to the contracting process for military functions. The
agreements between the U.S. Department of the Interior and CACI
give some sense of the problem. For Abu Ghraib, the intelligence
personnel were hired under a standing “blanket purchase agree-
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295. See DOI-CACI, supra note 284.
296. See infra note 318 and accompanying text.
297. CACI Int’l Inc. Work Orders Nos. 000035D004, 000036D004, 000037D004,
000038D0004, 000064D004, 000067D004, 000070D004, 000071D004, 000072D004,
000073D004, 000080D004, issued under DOI-CACI, supra note 284, available at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/docs/wow/CACI_ordersAll.pdf (last visited Sept 20, 2005).
298. CACI Int’l Inc. Work Order No. 000071D004, id. at 6.
299. Id.
300. DAIG REPORT, supra note 205, at 87-89. 
301. See CACI, CACI in Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions [hereinafter CACI in Iraq],
http://www.caci.com/iraq_faqs.shtml (last visited May 21, 2005); CACI, CACI SAYS THE FAY
REPORT CLEARLY SHIFTS FOCUS OF BLAME AWAY FROM ITS EMPLOYEE NAMED IN A PREVIOUS
REPORT (Aug. 26, 2004), available at http://www.caci.com/about/news/news2004/08_26_04_
NR.html.
ment” between the Department of the Interior and CACI, negotiated
in 2000.  Under such an agreement the procuring agency need not
295
request specific services at the time the agreement is made, but
rather may enter task orders as the need arises.  In 2003, eleven
296
task orders, worth $66.2 million were entered,  none of which was
297
the result of competitive bidding. The orders specify that CACI will
provide interrogation support and analysis work for the U.S. Army
in Iraq, including “debriefing of personnel, intelligence report
writing, and screening/interrogation of detainees at established
holding areas.”  Significantly, however, they do not expressly
298
require that the private contractor interrogators comply with
international law norms such as the Torture Convention or that
they receive training in such norms—training that U.S. military
interrogators would normally receive.  Indeed, an Army Inspector
299
General report concluded that 35% of CACI’s Iraqi interrogators did
not even have any “formal training in military interrogation policies
and techniques,” let alone training in international law norms.  
300
These contracts also do little to impose structural features to aid
in accountability. There is no requirement that contractors engage
in self-evaluation, for example, or that they meet performance
benchmarks, and there are no graduated penalties for noncompli-
ance. Indeed, although the employees implicated in the abuses at
Abu Ghraib no longer work at CACI,  it is unclear whether
301
government actors even so much as stepped up their supervision of
the contracts as a result of the scandal. Not only did the government
not terminate the contracts, CACI actually received a contract
202 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
302. See CACI in Iraq, supra note 301.
303. The Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. app. §§ 6, 8(c) (2000).
304. See CACI Work Orders, supra note 297 (detailing intelligence services to be provided
by CACI); Agreement Between the Department of Defense and Dataline, Inc., No. GS
DASW 01-03-F-0640 (Apr. 15, 2003), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/docs/
Dataline.pdf (detailing military communications support to be provided); Agreement Between
the Department of Defense and Environmental Chemical Corp., No. W912DY-04-D-0008 (Feb.
27, 2004), available at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/docs/EnvironmentalChemical
Corporation-Munitions.pdf (contracting for m unitions removal).
305. See Kinsey, supra note 254, at 161-62. 
306. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (2000).
307. Id. § 552(b)(4) (2000).
308. See THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, W INNING CONTRACTORS, U.S. CONTRACTORS
extension for interrogation services.  Finally, although the302
Department of Defense Inspector General (DOD IG) and its
subsidiary Inspectors General have the authority to monitor waste,
fraud, and other aspects of contract performance,  the contract
303
contains no provision for outside monitoring by independent groups.
A broader review of the publicly available contracts for military
services between U.S. authorities and private organizations
operating in Iraq and Afghanistan reveals similar deficiencies.
Shockingly, the contracts tend not to include substantive terms
that might impose accountability for violating any of the three
norms previously discussed: human dignity, rational nonarbitrary
governance, and anticorruption.  Moreover, most of these contracts
304
were negotiated in secret, without competition, on a “no bid”
basis.  In many cases it is impossible for the public or a watchdog
305
group even to obtain the text of the contracts, either because
government officials have kept them secret for security reasons
306
or because the contractors have exercised what is essentially a
veto, under FOIA, for certain types of commercial information.
307
Problems posed by secrecy are reinforced by problems of conflicts of
interest because many of the contracts are awarded to firms run by
former government personnel. Indeed, a recent study by The Center
for Public Integrity reports that sixty percent of the companies
that received contracts in Iraq or Afghanistan “had employees or
board members who either served in or had close ties to the
executive branch for Republican and Democratic administrations,
for members of Congress of both parties, or at the highest levels of
the military.”   
308
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REAP THE W INDFALLS OF POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION, (Oct. 30, 2003) http://www.
publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=65 [hereinafter W INNING CONTRACTORS].
309. Federal Acquisition Regulations System, 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.201-16.207.3 (2004). The
majority of government contracts are fixed price contracts. See W . NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION § 16.3, at 429 (3d ed. 2003).
310. 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.601-16.603-04.
311. Id. §§ 16.301-16.307. 
312. For a critique of cost reimbursement contracts, see THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC
INTEGRITY, OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT, SERVICE CONTRACTING HAS RISEN DRAMATICALLY IN
THE LAST DECADE, (Oct. 30, 2003) http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/report.aspx?aid=68
[hereinafter OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT]. Cost reimbursement contracts do contain an
estimated total cost and a cost ceiling that cannot be exceeded without the contracting officer’s
approval. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1. Under the FAR, cost reimbursement contracts can only be
utilized when costs cannot be estim ated with sufficient accuracy. Id. § 16.301-2.
313. OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT, supra note 312. 
314. Id.
315. Id.
The contracts’ payment structure enhances these difficulties.
Government contracts generally fall into one of three categories: (1)
fixed price, in which the government and the contractor decide on a
price to which the contractor is bound, even if costs run over;  (2)
309
time and materials, in which the government and contractor agree
on an hourly rate that includes labor, materials, and overhead;
310
and (3) cost-reimbursement, in which the government reimburses
the contractor for costs incurred in providing a service, plus a fee
that is calculated as a percentage of the cost.  Congress, the
311
Government Accountability Office, and other commentators have
expressed concern that cost-reimbursement contracts (also termed
“cost-plus” contracts), lead to waste and overcharging because of the
way payment is structured.  Under the cost-plus system, compa-
312
nies have an incentive to inflate the costs of services so that their
fee, typically measured as a percentage of this cost, is as high as
possible.  Even worse, some cost-plus contracts are structured so
313
that the government agrees to pay a fixed fee regardless of perfor-
mance, which dramatically reduces or eliminates incentives either
to provide effective performance or to control costs.  Despite these
314
serious problems with cost-plus contracts, they are widespread in
military contracting. Indeed, The Center for Public Integrity
estimates that the highest value contracts awarded in the last two
years in Iraq and Afghanistan—including those for military services
—all are cost-plus contracts.
315
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316. The Abu Ghraib intelligence contract, for example, was a contract of this type. See
supra note 295 and accompanying text.
317. ID/IQ contracts are governed by 48 C.F.R. §§ 16.500-16.506. For a discussion of ID/IQ
contracts, see Karen DaPonte Thornton, Fine Tuning Acquisition Reform ’s Favorite
Procurement Vehicle, the Indefinite Delivery Contract, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 383 (2002).
318. See 48 C.F.R. § 16.504.
319. See Thornton, supra note 317, at 387.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 387, 390, 419.
322. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, DOD USE OF MULTIPLE
AWARD TASK ORDER CONTRACTS, AUDIT REP. NO. 99-116 (Apr. 2, 1999) [hereinafter TASK
ORDER CONTRACTS]. The report concluded that “[c]ontracting officials engaged in questionable
procurement practices which resulted in DOD paying more for services procured under
multiple award contracts. Contracting officials justified awarding task orders to desired
contractors at higher prices by identifying minor technical differences....” Id. at 10; see also
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, MULTIPLE AWARD CONTRACTS FOR
SERVICES, AUDIT REP. NO. D-2001-189, at i (Sept. 30, 2001) (“Contracting organizations
continued to direct awards to selected sources without providing all multiple award
contractors a fair opportunity to be considered.”).
323. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITIONS: CONTRACTS
AWARDED FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BY THE DEFENSE CONTRACTING
Many of the military contracts are also indefinite delivery or
indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) contracts, leading to further problems.
316
Under this structure, the government awards a relatively open-
ended contract that does not specify how many services or goods will
be necessary or the dates upon which they will be required.  These
317
additional details are specified in subsequent task orders.  Of
318
course, such contracts may sometimes be necessary, because the
government cannot know in advance precisely what will be required
or for how long.  Normally, however, when such contracts are
319
negotiated the government is contracting with several companies at
a time, and because these companies are forced to compete against
each other to fill each task order the government is therefore more
likely to receive a good price.  In contrast, the ID/IQ contracts in
320
Iraq—again including the military contracts—often go to one con-
tractor only, inevitably leading to monopolistic pricing practices.
321
In fact, the DOD’s own IG has strongly criticized the agency for
overuse of such contracts, in part for this reason.  And several of
322
these contracts have been the subjects of investigations for waste
and fraud. For example, the DOD IG published a study concluding
that, of the twenty-four Iraq contracts investigated, twenty-two did
not follow federal contracting rules.  Likewise, the senior contract
323
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COMMAND-W ASHINGTON, REP. NO. D-2004-057, at 28-29 (Mar. 18, 2004) [hereinafter
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY]. The FAR lays out procedures for performance-based
contracts. Such contracts provide for a base fee and then an additional award based on
performance. 48 C.F.R. § 16.305. The government evaluates performance based on set criteria,
and then makes a unilateral decision as to the award amount. Id. § 16.405-2; see
OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT, supra note 312. Because of the broad application of exceptions
in the military context, such as an allowance for no-bid contracts in the case of em ergency,
and staffing shortages as discussed above, these provisions have less effect than they
otherwise might.
324. See Eckholm, supra note 75. The contracting official contends that Arm y officials
retaliated against her for her criticisms, excluding her from key meetings. Id.
325. See Witte, supra note 75.
326. For a searing indictment of the government’s failure to oversee military contractors
and that failure’s role in the Abu Ghraib atrocities, see Steven L. Schooner, Contractor
Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a Stream lined, Outsourced
Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 549, 570-72 (2005).
327. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY, supra note 323, at 24.
328. COMPTROLLER GEN., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOURCING AND ACQUISITION, REP.
NO. GAO-03-771R, at 1 (May 23, 2003); see also OUTSOURCING GOVERNMENT, supra note 312.
For a detailed discussion on depletion of the acquisition workforce, see David A. Whiteford,
Negotiated Procurements: Squandering the Benefit of the Bargain, 32 PUB. CONT. L.J.
509, 555-57 (2003). 
329. W hiteford, supra note 328, at 555-57.
officer for the Army recently made a public statement charging that
contracts with KBR for military services in Iraq and the Balkans
violated contract regulations and threatened “the ‘integrity of the
federal contracting program,’” in part because KBR representa-
tives were present at a meeting setting contract terms and the no-
bid exception was used too broadly.  Yet, in an illustration of just
324
how difficult it will be to reform the contracting process, this critic
was recently demoted, reportedly as a result of leveling these
criticisms.
325
Oversight of military contracts may also be lax because of the
sheer number and scope of the contracts and the staffing shortages
in government offices charged with such oversight.  The DOD IG
326
study concluded that more than half of the Iraq contracts had not
been adequately monitored.  This fact is not surprising, given that
327
the Defense Department’s acquisition workforce was reduced by
more than half between 1990 and 2001, while the department’s
contracting workload increased by more than twelve percent.  In
328
addition, those who are assigned to monitor contract performance
are often inadequately trained.  Also, in an ironic twist, private
329
contractors themselves are often hired to write the procedural
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330. See SINGER, CORPORATE W ARRIORS, supra note 23, at 123-24.
331. The DOD has taken more and more control over reconstruction and emergency relief
functions, normally the province of USAID. See THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY,
CONTRACTORS: IRAQ, at http://www.publicintegrity.org/wow/bio.aspx?act=pro&fil=IQ (last
visited Sept. 20, 2005) (compiling all Iraq reconstruction contracts) [hereinafter IRAQ—ALL
AGENCIES]. The State Department, meanwhile, manages the contract with DynCorp to
provide Iraqi police training. Id. The State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (PRM) manages refugee assistance funds. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration, http://www.state.gov/g/prm (last visited Sept. 21, 2005).
332. W INNING CONTRACTORS, supra note 308.
333. Schooner, supra note 326, at 567-72.
334. Id.
rules governing contracting rules and monitoring protocols, thus
leading to further conflict-of-interest problems. For example, the
DOD handbook on the contracting process was drafted by none
other than MPRI itself!  Finally, because authority to issue
330
military contracts is dispersed across multiple agencies, interagency
communication issues and conflict-of-interest problems can impede
oversight.  Indeed, officials at the various agencies often use
331
different methods to calculate the costs of contracts, and these
methods may also vary from those used by the companies them-
selves.  In addition, because agencies can earn fees for facilitating
332
other agencies’ contracts but are not adequately held to account for
monitoring those contracts, agencies have incentives to sponsor
other agencies’ contracts but little incentive to supervise them.
333
These arrangements can lead to abuse, as at Abu Ghraib. Indeed,
CACI was hired to perform interrogation services through a Defense
Department task order under an existing contract between CACI
and the Department of the Interior.  
334
Using the domestic private prison context as a model for building
accountability mechanisms into military contracts, it seems that
such contracts should include, at a minimum, clear requirements
that contractors abide by international human rights and humani-
tarian law standards applicable to government actors and receive
training at least equivalent to that received by government actors.
More of these agreements could also include specific performance
benchmarks and requirements for self-evaluation and monitoring.
Although the various agency IGs and contract officers have a
nominal role overseeing many of the contracts, their ability to
engage in meaningful monitoring would be increased through better
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335. For an argument that military contracts should contain terms allowing the imposition
of fines when contract employees engage in various types of misconduct, see Vernon, supra
note 34, at 391-92.
336. See Freeman, supra note 6, at 634-35.
337. See Civilians Convention, supra note 111, at art. 143.
338. Accreditation is particularly prevalent in the privatized health care setting where
some governments require that private managed care organizations must be certified by
independent organizations such as the National Center for Quality Assurance to be eligible
to receive Medicaid funding. See SARA ROSENBAUM ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, NEGOTIATING
THE NEW HEALTH SYSTEM: A NATIONWIDE STUDY OF MEDICAID MANAGED CARE CONTRACTS,
at v-vi (2d ed. 1998). 
staffing and increased use of graduated penalties. For example, the
government could, as it does in some domestic contexts, specify that
when a contractor is not performing well under the contract,
government monitoring can increase, and, if problems rise to a
certain level, the government can actually take over or rescind the
contract. Contracts could also provide for fines when contract
employees engage in abuses.  In addition, as in the prison
335
context, contracts could entrust outside, independent groups with
the responsibility for monitoring performance.  Though security
336
concerns might make such monitoring impractical in some
circumstances, under the Geneva Conventions the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) already plays a monitoring role
for government-run detention facilities during wartime.  Thus,
337
a contract could specify that the ICRC also would monitor a
privately run facility. Finally, also drawing from the domestic
context, independent entities could provide accreditation, certifying
that private contractors have offered proof that they will comply
with the laws of war and human rights standards as well as the
norms of rational, nonarbitrary provision of services.  
338
Of course, contractual accountability is not a panacea. Oversight
may be lax, contractors may figure out ways to file effective
compliance reports rather than to actually comply with provisions,
and courts are a cumbersome and costly enforcement tool. Also, the
added costs of compliance and oversight may, in some circum-
stances, swallow the purported benefits of privatization in the first
place. Nevertheless, at the very least international law scholars
might fruitfully learn from domestic efforts to enhance contractual
accountability. 
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in the Service of the State, in W AR, MORALITY, AND THE M ILITARY PROFESSION 107, 108-11
(Malham M. Wakin ed., 1979).
340. See ARENDT, supra  note 114, at 246-48 (criticizing lack of accountability within
German Nazi bureaucracy due to fragmented nature of authority).
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4. Internal Institutional Accountability
As discussed previously, the internal institutional culture of an
organization or corporation as well as its internal disciplinary
system may profoundly affect the likelihood that its personnel will
observe public-regarding norms of behavior. Unlike the three
accountability mechanisms just surveyed, however, privatization of
military functions does substantially affect the degree of institu-
tional accountability. This is because militaries, and in particular
the U.S. military, have distinctive institutional cultures that can
impose strong internal sanctions for wrongdoing. This institutional
culture is very different from that found in most military contractor
firms. 
The U.S. military is a rigidly hierarchical organization that
transcends the ordinary hierarchies of civilian bureaucracy.
Scholars have written extensively about the hierarchical nature of
the military and its culture of obedience, loyalty, and honor, a
culture that members of the military consciously construct.
339
Moreover, because of the chain of command system, the U.S.
military is different from an ordinary bureaucracy in which
authority and responsibility is sometimes fragmented and dispersed
horizontally.  
340
This hierarchical structure ensures that internal sanctions have
a good deal of force, because those lower down the chain of the
command constantly seek the approval of those higher up the chain
and must submit to their authority. The military also has its own
internal justice system, set forth in the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ), which provides for the punishment of military
personnel for military infractions as well as crimes that could be
tried in civilian courts.  In addition, local commanders have a good
341
deal of discretion to discipline members of their units for noncrimi-
nal infractions of military policy. Obedience to commanders is
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343. See L. Neal Ellis, Jr., Judicial Review of Promotions in the Military, 98 MIL. L. REV.
129, 129-30 (1982); Turley, supra note 149, at 62.
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1 (Sept. 28, 1992). 
345. See, e.g., Declaration of Peter Bauer Filed in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Preliminary Injunction Against CACI International, Saleh v. Titan, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1087
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11, 13-21 (Winter 2002) (outlining target approval process during Kosovo conflict).
enhanced due to the combination of “up or out” advancement
requirements  and a performance review system in which immedi-
342
ate supervisors are responsible for the work of their underlings.
343
Moreover, because internal status within the hierarchy is a
significant factor for many military personnel, superiors can impose
status-based sanctions, such as reassignment, demotion, firing, and
dishonorable discharge and know that such sanctions will have real
impact. Although the hierarchical structure may sometimes stifle
dissent, limit participation in policymaking, and inhibit reporting
of abuses, it is designed to enhance compliance with the norms that
are widely accepted throughout the chain of command, and there
are significant internal institutional penalties for infraction of those
norms.
From the post-Vietnam War era until September 11, 2001, the
U.S. military had a tradition of inculcating international humani-
tarian law norms throughout its ranks. For example, the U.S.
military actively trains its personnel in the laws of war. Army
handbooks specifically prohibit torture and other forms of mistreat-
ment of prisoners of war or other detainees.  Military interrogators
344
receive extensive training in the laws of war and are taught not to
use excessive force during interrogations.  Even during combat,
345
military lawyers are often called upon to clear targets in advance to
ensure that attacks will not inflict an unacceptable amount of
collateral damage.  Given that the military hierarchy does not
346
reward dissent, the fact that military lawyers were among the first
to condemn President Bush’s proposal to establish military commis-
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preparations to begin war crimes trials against four detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, two
senior prosecutors complained in confidential messages last year that the trial system had
been secretly arranged to improve the chance of conviction and to deprive defendants of
material that could prove their innocence.”). The military bureaucracy is not monolithic,
however, and military lawyers may represent a somewhat insular subculture that is
particularly committed to international humanitarian law.
348. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for
Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://news.
findlaw.com/ nytim es/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf, rescinded by Memorandum from Daniel
Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Jam es B. Comey,
Deputy Attorney General (Dec. 30, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/dagmemo.
pdf.
349. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, W ORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATIONS IN THE
GLOBAL W AR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.npr.org/documents/2004/dodmemo
030306.pdf.
350. See, e.g., Hearing on the Nomination of the Honorable Alberto R. Gonzales as Attorney
General of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005),
sions to try terrorism suspects and Pentagon proposals to allow
harsh interrogation techniques indicates the extent to which
international humanitarian law norms are taken seriously within
the military bureaucracy.
347
When norms are not widely shared within the institution or are
ambiguous, however, it may be difficult for the military to impose
internal institutional sanctions to enforce them, and soldiers may
be hesitant to report abuses or punish offenders. Indeed, many
commentators suggest that the abuses at Abu Ghraib took place
because proposed changes in interrogation policies—reflected in
legal memos such as those from the Office of Legal Counsel  and
348
the Defense Working Group  setting forth a narrow definition of
349
torture and identifying a military necessity exception to the use of
coercive interrogation tactics—at best created ambiguity about the
acceptable limits on interrogation tactics and at worst authorized
coercive practices.  Ambiguous norms coupled with the hierarchi
350
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on file with author).
351. See Luban, supra note 350 (manuscript at 29).
352. Reid, supra note 216.
353. Associated Press, Prosecutors Revise Charges Against Guard in Prison Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 20, 2005, at A18.
354. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
355. For example, General Karpinski, the officer in charge of the facility at the time the
abuse took place, has been reprim anded and denied opportunity for promotion. HERSH, supra
note 62, at 40-41.
356. See Vernon, supra note 34, at 382-84.
cal command structure may have created a disincentive to report
abuses, because subordinates could not be sure whether the
practices were acceptable to those above them in the chain of
command. By contrast, if the policy had more clearly forbidden such
abuse, reporting would not have carried the same risks and may
even have been favored. Because of the organizational structure of
the military, bright line rules such as a clear policy forbidding
torture are particularly important.
351
Despite the unfortunately mixed signals emanating from the
military hierarchy regarding interrogation techniques, military
authorities nevertheless have imposed penalties carrying real
consequences. Nine uniformed military personnel have been
charged, and eight have been convicted or struck plea bargains thus
far.  It is true that some of those convicted have received no jail
352
time,  and that thus far no high-ranking officials have been
353
charged with abuse. The military has conducted numerous investi-
gations, though, into the abuses at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere.
354
Due to the status-based culture of the military, the significance of
the nonincarceration penalties that the institution has imposed
should not be underestimated.  
355
Against this backdrop, it is clear that privatizing military
functions is likely to undermine the culture of institutional account-
ability that does exist. Private military support contractors who
operate in the field are not subject to commanders’ authority but
rather are controlled by the terms of their contract.  In addition,
356
the local commander has no authority to mete out punishments for
disciplinary infractions, and contractors cannot be tried under the
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UCMJ.  As a result, military commanders must seek contract357
officers’ approval before giving an order to support teams on the
battlefield, thereby creating logistical and tactical difficulties.  In
358
any event, the private employees are fundamentally accountable
only to the institutions that employ them.
To be sure, just as military bureaucracies are not all alike,
neither are private military corporations. Yet, even if we look at
each of the three types of firms identified previously we can see
that, though they vary, they are all likely to have weaker modes of
institutional accountability and less respect for and internalization
of the norms of human rights and humanitarian law than the U.S.
military itself. For example, though they are often run by former
military personnel, military consulting firms such as MPRI have an
entirely different incentive structure from the U.S. military and
operate under far fewer institutional and political constraints. In
particular, MPRI is now owned by institutional investors,  and
359
profit pressures may make the firm less responsive to the impera-
tives of international legal norms. While many of the employees
may have received training in the military and thus may have
imbibed its norms and values, the principles of international law
may hold less sway in the face of potential profits. Indeed, MPRI
has been cited by the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) as being potentially implicated in war
crimes based on its training of the Croatian army.  In addition,
360
just the fact that firms such as MPRI are able to hire former
military officers at high prices may erode the impact of status-based
sanctions such as firing and demotion within the military itself: a
disgraced officer need not live with the disgrace because he or she
can now jump to a private firm.
361
2005] GOVERNMENT FOR HIRE 213
362. In discussing the incident, retired Lt. Col. Ralph Peters observed that “what’s clearly
happened in Iraq is we violated our own rules about troop dispersion in wartime. I suspect
it has to do with outsourcing. This mess hall, mess facility, chow hall was run by a contractor.
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364. See Rubin, supra note 73, at 44-46.
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Military support firms such as KBR have even fewer cultural ties
to the military, even though former military officials may fill senior
management positions. Moreover, as with the consulting firms, the
profit motive may encourage practices that undermine the rules
and regulations that shape behavior within the U.S. military. For
example, following a U.S. military regulation that limits the number
of troops allowed to gather in one place at mealtimes could have
prevented many of the deaths caused by a December 2004 insur-
gency bombing of a troop mess hall in Iraq. Because a private firm
ran the mess hall and did not follow the U.S. military regulation,
more troops were allowed to gather, ultimately increasing the
number of casualties.  Such firms similarly do not use the same
362
scrutiny as the U.S. military to investigate the backgrounds of
employees for possible security risks.
363
Finally, military provider firms, which supply actual combat
services to governments, tend to have a culture that is the least
constrained by norms of international law and is the furthest
removed from the kind of rule-based hierarchies found in the
professionalized military of the United States and other demo-
cratic countries. To be sure, many employees of military provider
firms, such as the now defunct Executive Outcomes and Sandline
International, come from organized militaries. These are often
militaries with extensive records of human rights abuses, however,
such as the South African Defense Forces during the apartheid
era.  Employees of these companies are often known for their free-
364
wheeling, adventurous, non-rule-bound style.  They are the new
365
mercenaries, renamed as military provider firms in an attempt to
convey a greater professionalization but with strong ties to the
mercenary culture that has been associated with a swashbuckling
insouciance for centuries, a lack of connection to a national identity
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or set of values, a commitment to personal profit, and a willingness
to violate laws, norms, and values to make money.  
366
It seems clear, therefore, that the use of such mercenaries and
private military corporations will substantially lessen the internal
institutional checks on behavior that we still see in the U.S.
military. To be sure, the shift in internal institutional accountability
due to privatization may not be the same in all contexts. For
example, some militaries may be intensely hierarchical but not
accept the norms of international humanitarian law, in which case
a shift to a private corporation that also does not have a culture of
respect for such norms will not make an enormous difference.
Nonetheless, in contrast to highly structured militaries that do
inculcate respect for international humanitarian law norms, the use
of military support, provider, and advice firms does represent a
significant change in internal institutional accountability. 
B. Foreign Aid
As with the military functions described above, the privatization
of foreign aid has far less impact on legal liability than privatization
in roughly analogous domestic contexts, such as health care and
welfare. This is again because the baseline of legal accountability—
even for direct government aid—is much lower in the international
context than it is with regard to domestic services. Moreover, as
with the military example, an exploration of potential alternative
modes of accountability may help mitigate concerns about increas-
ing privatization, though as we will see, foreign aid contracts
currently offer far less accountability than the analogous domestic
contracts. When considering the provision of aid, violations of norms
against waste, corruption, and rational delivery of services are
particularly applicable, and the following sections will therefore
focus on accountability for violations of these norms, though I will
make reference to norms of human dignity where appropriate.
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1. Legal Accountability
Suppose that private aid workers, operating under contracts with
the U.S., the UN, and other governments, set up refugee camps in
Africa to provide aid to victims of war or atrocities fleeing their
home country. In these camps, refugees receive food, medical care,
shelter, and other forms of basic humanitarian aid. Further assume
that, as in the aid efforts after the Rwandan genocide, aid workers
make poor decisions about aid distribution, due to the lack of an
effective early warning system, proliferation of aid organizations,
poor coordination, a faulty distribution system, a lack of clear
standards or best practices for aid provision, and untrained and
inexperienced personnel.  Finally, suppose that as a result of these
367
problems, individuals who would otherwise have received medical
care or essential food are left to die of illness or malnutrition. 
In this scenario, whether the aid was provided by private aid
organizations or directly by governments, the prospects of legal
accountability would be virtually nonexistent. First, there is no
clear right of foreign aid recipients to receive aid, or, once it is
provided, to receive such aid in a nonarbitrary fashion. Although
economic, social, and cultural rights might be deemed to include
rights to the goods and services necessary to provide a minimum
social safety net, these rights are typically conceived of as rights
against one’s own state, not foreign aid donors.  Moreover,
368
impoverished governments are usually given considerable leeway in
how they fulfill these rights: best efforts and reasonable progress
are often deemed sufficient, and there is, accordingly, no clear
affirmative substantive right to the actual provision of goods.
369
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Some scholars have attempted to locate a right to humanitarian aid
within the Geneva Conventions, but this interpretation is not widely
accepted.  On the other hand, even if there is no clear affirmative
370
right to receive foreign aid, there could conceivably be a right, once
aid is being provided, to have such aid delivered in a nonarbitrary,
non-corrupt fashion. Indeed, the aid community, responding to the
failures of the Rwandan relief effort, has now developed guidelines
and standards for the provision of relief,  and some have argued
371
that these guidelines and standards should be enforced as rights of
aid beneficiaries.  Nevertheless, there is by no means widespread
372
agreement on this point even within the aid community, let alone a
treaty or binding agreement among states.
373
Because there is no clear right, either against state or private
actors, there is virtually no possible avenue of legal accountability.
Directly administered governmental aid programs often consist of
either cash transfers to foreign governments or to NGOs.  In such
374
circumstances, a suit alleging abuses conceivably could be brought
within the domestic legal systems of the recipient countries, but
court systems in those countries are often ill-equipped to address
such cases, even assuming that the domestic law recognized a right
to receive aid. In any event, remedies against foreign government
personnel would almost certainly not be available. It is worth noting
that there is now one exception to this lack of legal accountability.
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For aid provided under World Bank auspices, recipients can bring
claims of aid mismanagement before specially constituted
tribunals.  Apart from this new venue, however, there is little
375
opportunity for legal recourse. Thus, if private contractors provide
the aid instead of state actors, little will change for the aid recipi-
ents with regard to legal accountability mechanisms. Legal recourse
is unlikely in either scenario. 
In the domestic U.S. setting, the result of privatization is much
more significant. Although there is still no underlying right to
receive aid, when the government does choose to provide assistance
such as health care or welfare to needy populations, arbitrary
provision of that aid is subject to legal remedy.  Privatization in
376
the domestic context, therefore, reduces the prospects for relief
because the right to nonarbitrary provision of services applies
only to state actors. Accordingly, claimants would need to demon-
strate that there is enough of a connection between the government
and the private provider to satisfy the state action doctrine, and,
as previously discussed,  courts are increasingly unwilling to
377
recognize such a connection.  
378
The main difference, therefore, between the international and the
domestic context is not the existence of an underlying right to the
goods or services in question,  but rather the existence of a right
379
to have those aid programs, once launched, administered in a
rational and nonarbitrary manner. In the foreign aid context, the
population receiving the aid has not been accorded such a right, and
although the domestic population of the aid-giving country might
well have an interest in making sure its government acts rationally
in providing aid abroad, there is not likely to be any way to pursue
such an interest in a legal forum. 
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14 (Apr. 1, 2004-Sept. 30, 2004), available at http://www.usaid.gov/oig/public/semiann/
sarc0409.pdf [hereinafter USAIDIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT].
382. See E lizabeth Becker, With Record Rise in Foreign Aid Comes Change in How It Is
Monitored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2003, § 1, at 10. 
383. Editorial, Are We Stingy? Yes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at A22 (“According to a poll,
most Americans believe the United States spends 24 percent of its budget on aid to poor
countries; it actually spends well under a quarter of 1 percent.”).
384. USAIDIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT, supra note 381, at 14.
2. Democratic Accountability
Privatizing foreign aid likewise does not reduce the scope of
democratic accountability nearly as much as privatizing analogous
domestic functions, again because the baseline of accountability is
already low, even for direct governmental aid. It is true, of course,
that U.S. citizens can try to influence the provision of government
aid to foreign countries through the democratic process. Moreover,
such aid programs are theoretically subject to FOIA, inspector
general oversight, and whistleblower protection statutes.  But
380
public oversight of direct cash transfers to foreign governments may
actually be weaker than the scrutiny that private organizations
receive.  In addition, although a number of NGOs and private
381
groups regularly lobby Congress to fund particular aid efforts,
382
foreign aid does not appear to be a high priority issue for domestic
voters. Most Americans assume that we give far more aid than we
actually do,  and the issue does not typically rise to the forefront
383
of political debate. Thus, the likelihood of democratic accountability
even for direct government aid is limited. As a result, the degree of
scrutiny will likely depend solely on whether the aid includes
cooperative arrangements with oversight bodies in the recipient
countries.
384
Because of this low baseline, when aid is provided by private
actors funded with taxpayer money, the degree of democratic
accountability is not dramatically altered. For example, the
transparency of the process, a key component of democratic
accountability, is not significantly reduced. To be sure, FOIA
requests will probably not be able to provide a window on the actual
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388. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)(1), (c), (d), (h) (2000).
389. See, e.g., 2004 VOLAG REPORT, supra note 91.
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on-the-ground activities of the private entities—because they are
not government actors—but FOIA requests could still be used to
access the text of contracts.  For example, eight of the sixteen
385
USAID contracts with private organizations for aid projects in Iraq
can be downloaded from the USAID website.  Inspector General
386
reports typically focus not only on the direct activities by govern-
mental actors but on aid delivered under agreements with private
entities as well.  Whistleblower protections also apply, along with
387
private qui tam enforcement provisions, whether the whistleblower
is employed by the government or a private contractor.
388
In addition, USAID, the primary agency responsible for delivering
foreign aid, has a long history of trying to provide information
about, and to study the efficacy of, foreign aid, including aid
delivered through Private Voluntary Organizations (PVOs). Indeed,
each year the agency publishes a report on PVO aid.  The combina-
389
tion of USAID’s relative transparency and the comparatively
aggressive oversight of foreign aid by Congress means that far more
information is available about private aid agreements than, for
example, private military contracts.
On the other hand, although USAID’s development assistance
and emergency humanitarian relief funds are well documented, aid
provided by other agencies—such as military assistance to foreign
countries through the DOD or policing and international law
enforcement assistance through the Department of State—is far less
transparent. In addition, because aid is provided by so many
different agencies, it is often difficult to locate comprehensive
information about all aid programs connected to a particular
location.  In post-conflict or conflict settings, such as Iraq and
390
Afghanistan, the problem is particularly acute because security
concerns and the blending of military missions and aid operations
can make it more difficult to access information about the aid
component. 
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It is also worth noting that aid given to for-profit, as opposed to
charitable, companies tends to be less open to public scrutiny. For
example, the USAID Annual Report of aid provided through PVOs
does not include for-profit aid providers.  In addition, for-profit
391
entities can exercise the trade secrets exemption of FOIA, which in
some cases serves to block agencies from even revealing the
existence of some contracts.  This lack of transparency is a
392
particular problem when, as in the Iraq reconstruction efforts,
fifteen of the sixteen USAID contracts are with for-profit entities.
393
Nevertheless, the transparency costs from privatizing foreign aid
are small compared to those associated with the privatization of
domestic government services that are roughly analogous to foreign
aid, such as disaster relief, health care, education, and welfare. This
is because the recipients of domestic aid, unlike in the foreign
context, are themselves part of the democratic polity that is being
taxed to pay for the aid. Thus, aid recipients and others who believe
that aid is being provided in an irrational, arbitrary, or corrupt
manner can register their concern at the ballot box, contact their
representatives directly, or lobby them through interest groups.
Certainly, some of the recipients of government-run programs, such
as welfare recipients, do not have significant political clout. But the
elderly (who receive health benefits under Medicare), families with
children (who benefit from education), and those in a disaster area
(potentially anyone) may have a more powerful political voice. In
addition, as discussed above, the mechanisms designed to create
transparency in order to enable public and legislative oversight,
such as FOIA and the APA, are less robust with respect to private
contractors.  Accordingly, when domestic aid is privatized, access
394
to the democratic process is significantly reduced because the actors
running the programs and, in some cases, making the relevant rules
are no longer government personnel subject to democratic checks.
On the other hand, just because privatization of foreign aid does
not result in as dramatic a loss in democratic accountability as
domestic privatization does not mean that there is no cause for
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concern. Indeed, the reason for the lesser impact of outsourcing in
this context is the distressingly low level of accountability to begin
with. This low level of accountability stems in part from the fact
that those who are paying for the aid have little stake in its effective
delivery because the aid is being received in a distant location.
Conversely, the recipients of the aid, who are most likely to know
and care about whether the aid is being distributed in a manner
that is rational, fair, and free from corruption, have little or no voice
within the democratic polity of the provider country. 
Of course, addressing this sort of democratic deficit may be
problematic because the recipients of foreign aid are by definition
not members of the democratic polity of the provider country.
Accordingly, some critics have argued that the only appropriate
vehicle for aid beneficiaries to participate in the democratic process
is within their own countries, by lobbying their diplomatic officials
to take up any concerns about international issues on their behalf.
395
Such lobbying efforts, however, will often be unsuccessful, either
because the local government is authoritarian, corrupt, or ineffec-
tual (and therefore relatively impervious to democratic pressure), or
because diplomats will be reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them
by complaining about the way in which foreign aid is being deliv-
ered. 
In order to address this problem, international NGOs might lobby
in donor countries on behalf of aid beneficiaries. For example, Save
the Children-UK partnered with the United Nations High Commis-
sioner of Refugees to report on the abuses in the West African
refugee camps and led the ensuing reform efforts.  Other organiza-
396
tions, such as Human Rights Watch, also issued reports to raise
public awareness of the problem and to advocate change both within
donor countries and at the UN.
397
Nevertheless, given that foreign aid may have such a profound
impact on beneficiaries’ lives, it may also be appropriate for
beneficiaries to participate in some way in the democratic processes
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400. See id.
401. See, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2000); False Claims
Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000). The False Claims Act also provides for private
of donor countries. Indeed, the analogy of the private contractor to
a trustee  might help capture this idea. For example, beneficiaries
398
might at least be included in the design of aid programs.  In
399
addition, beneficiaries could participate in the evaluation of such
programs.  Moreover, this sort of minimal democratic participation
400
could regularly be included as a requirement of the aid agreement
itself. 
3. Contractual Accountability 
In the foreign aid context, government actors have consciously
employed the vehicle of the aid agreement to try to impose a
measure of accountability, at least with regard to norms against
waste and corruption, and norms of rational and nonarbitrary
provision of programs. Even with respect to these norms, however,
accountability has often suffered due to poor oversight. In addition,
foreign aid agreements have largely failed to incorporate norms of
human dignity, which some domestic contracts have sought to
include. Also, the accountability provided by these contracts is
necessarily limited because the contractual oversight mechanisms
are primarily concerned with making sure the contractor is
accountable to the government providing the aid and, through the
government, to taxpayers. Far less attention has been paid to the
possibility that contractors might be made accountable to the
foreign aid beneficiaries themselves.
The United States has been a leader in using contractual
requirements to help ensure accountability in the provision of
privatized foreign aid. With respect to corruption and fraud, an
extensive array of statutory offenses provide a backdrop of legal
accountability  that is supplemented by the highly detailed
401
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regulatory framework of the Federal Acquisitions Regulation
(FAR).  The FAR mandates a variety of specific procedures
402
designed to minimize the possibility of fraud and corruption in the
contracting process, and applies to many categories of aid agree-
ments.  In addition, the various agencies charged with administer-
403
ing foreign aid—such as the Defense Department, the State
Department, and USAID—have each developed additional regula-
tions and supplementary procedures pursuant to various enabling
acts.  
404
Taken together, this regulatory scheme prohibits bribes and
payments to contracting officers  and provides a host of rules
405
regarding conflicts of interest,  protection of whistleblowers,
406 407
standardization of accounting terms,  and various other contract
408
award procedures, all of which are designed to ensure as much
competition and openness as possible. The statutory and regulatory
framework also includes provisions for independent monitoring
through the inspectors general of the respective agencies  as well
409
as for auditing of contracts by independent private accounting
firms.  In the case of high-profile aid programs such as the Iraq
410
reconstruction, further statutory requirements supplement these
ordinary rules.
411
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GovExec.COM, May 20, 2003, at http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0503/052003h1.htm.
416. See id.
417. Ed Harrim an, Where Has All the Money Gone?, LONDON REV. OF BOOKS, July 7, 2005,
Yet, despite this extensive statutory and regulatory framework,
aid programs are often relatively unmonitored because many of the
oversight requirements tend not to be applied in emergency
situations, which are, of course, the times when relief efforts and
post-reconstruction aid tend to be most needed. Thus, in many
foreign aid contexts, the ordinary contracting procedures, such as
competitive bidding, are waived,  and contracts that involve far
412
less government oversight—such as the cost-plus agreements that
were notorious in Iraq —become the norm. 
413
In addition, although the statutory and regulatory framework
provides for monitoring, monitors are often provided with insuffi-
cient resources. In Iraq, although USAID has responsibility for
approximately $3.6 billion in reconstruction projects,  the agency
414
had only four contract monitoring personnel on the ground as of
March 2003, and by September 2004 that number had increased
only to eight.  In fact, due to the difficulties of monitoring contracts
415
with so little staff, USAID determined to contract out the monitor-
ing function itself!  
416
Other agencies responsible for Iraq contracting, such as the DOD
and the now-dismantled Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA),
have also devoted very few resources to contract oversight. A recent
report notes that the “CPA hadn’t kept accounts for the hundreds of
millions of dollars of cash in its vault, had awarded contracts worth
billions of dollars to American firms without tender, and had no idea
what was happening to the money from the Development Fund for
Iraq which was being spent by the interim Iraqi government
ministries.”  
417
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Abuse in U.S. Government Contracting in Iraq, 109th Cong. 4 (2005) (Statement of Alan
Grayson, Former CPA Official) [hereinafter SDPC Hearing], available at http://democrats.
senate.gov/dpc/dpchearing. cfm?A=19.
419. Id. at 1 (statement of Alan Grayson).
420. Id. at 1-2 (statement of Alan Grayson).
421. Id. at 3-4 (statement of Franklin Willis).
422. Id. at 4 (statement of Franklin W illis). Of course, the lack of oversight may have a
more cynical explanation: it permits private contractors (who may have powerful connections
within government) to reap profits without significant constraints. 
423. Id. at 2 (statement of A lan Grayson). The employee has since claimed the benefit of
whistleblower protections and has filed a private enforcement suit under the False Claim s
Act. Id. at 2-3 (statement of Alan Grayson).
One former CPA official, Alan Grayson, has argued that, as a
result of poor oversight, “contracts were made that were mistakes,
and were poorly, if at all, supervised” and that “money was spent
that could have been saved, if we simply had the right numbers of
people.”  As an example, he cites two $16 million contracts
418
awarded by USAID to the firm Custer Battles to provide security for
the Baghdad airport and the distribution of Iraqi dinars—despite
the fact that the firm had virtually no experience in security
service.  Indeed, Custer Battles employees reportedly charted a
419
flight to Beirut with $10 million in new Iraqi dinars in their
luggage—which were promptly confiscated by Lebanese officials.
420
Although the contracts contained enough vague terms to raise red
flags, they were virtually unsupervised because of staffing short-
ages.  Though it surely would have been expensive to devote a staff
421
person to supervise this one contract exclusively, such a step would
actually have saved at least $4 million.  Indeed, according to a
422
former employee, the company took advantage of this lack of
oversight by setting up sham Cayman Islands subsidiaries to
submit invoices, and by regularly overcharging for materials—in
one case billing the United States $10 million for materials that it
purchased for $3.5 million.  
423
With respect to the norm of rationality, the United States has led
the way in requiring “results-based” accountability of its private aid
providers through contractual terms. Indeed, USAID, perhaps
motivated in part by the need to justify its activities to an increas-
ingly skeptical Congress, was one of the first agencies in the United
226 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:135
424. See generally USAID, RESULTS-ORIENTED ASSISTANCE: A USAID SOURCEBOOK,
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see generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY (1997).
427. Smillie, At Sea in a Sieve?, supra note 23, at 10-11.
428. See AGREEMENT BETWEEN USAID AND BECHTEL, INC., IRAQ INFRASTSTRUCTURE
RECONSTRUCTION—PHASE II, No. SPU-C-00-04-00001-00 (Jan. 4, 2004), available at
http://www.usaid .gov/iraq/contracts/iirii .htm l; A GREEMENT B ETWEEN U SA ID AND
BEARINGPOINT, INC., ECONOMIC RECOVERY, REFORM, AND SUSTAINED GROWTH, No. RAN-C-00-
States to take then Vice President Al Gore’s “Reinventing Govern-
ment” message to heart. Under this “results-based” approach, the
agency performs self-evaluations of each program’s efficacy, and
private aid providers are contractually obligated to evaluate
themselves as well.  Indeed, in the 1980s, even before the
424
“reinventing government” movement, USAID launched a series of
studies to determine the effectiveness of its aid programs,  and
425
evaluations are now seen as central to all of its activities. Every
private voluntary organization aid project is thus evaluated, either
by USAID, the organization, or both. 
Nevertheless, the evaluation process has posed challenges. For
example, by their very nature, results-based contracts raise difficult
questions about how best to measure output. Such criteria may be
relatively easy to quantify if the project involves simply building a
bridge or dam, but are very difficult to capture if the project involves
intangibles, such as fostering human development or building civil
society.  Likewise, short-term results, such as whether food aid
426
was delivered, are much easier to measure than longer-term
systemic effects on poverty, education, and so on. As a consequence,
results-based contracts tend to put more emphasis on short-term
delivery of services rather than longer-term impact.  Even more
427
fundamentally, because contracting for emergency humanitarian
relief tends to happen quickly and with very small staffs, many such
contracts do not actually contain any results-based requirements.
With regard to Iraq, for example, a review of the publicly available
USAID contracts reveals that only a few set forth specific perfor-
mance benchmarks or requirements.
428
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429. Development aid may be an exception. See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
430. See Smillie, United States, supra note 81, at 257-58.
Finally, two other factors tend to limit contractual accountability
in the foreign aid context. First, the framework of accountability
incorporated within foreign aid contracts makes it clear that the
type of “accountability” sought is primarily accountability to the
contracting government agency and, implicitly, to the taxpayers of
the government providing the aid. Accordingly, there is again little
effort to consider the accountability of foreign aid providers to the
actual beneficiaries of the foreign aid.  To be sure, the overarching
429
goals of the U.S. government—for example, to promote successful
development or provide humanitarian relief—may be consonant
with the ultimate goals of aid beneficiaries. But because the
reporting requirements are tailored to meet the needs of the U.S.
contracting agency, non-U.S. entities may actually have difficulty
competing for contracts because they are not as well versed in all of
the requirements and may not have the resources to provide the
necessary documentation.  This difficulty for non-U.S. entities is
430
problematic because at least when an aid contract is awarded to a
company or nonprofit organization within the country receiving the
aid, there will be some local participation in the aid process, not to
mention greater benefits to the local economy. Yet even then, the
ultimate recipients of the aid are rarely consulted to determine
whether they believe the aid efforts to be successful. 
Second, accountability under foreign aid contracts is limited
because such contracts rarely address norms of human dignity. Few
contracts, for example, contain provisions that require contractors
to comply with international human rights or humanitarian norms
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436. Id. Although for-profit organizations cannot officially join Sphere, contracting agencies
could require such organizations to follow the Sphere guidelines in fulfilling contracts. 
or to receive training in this area. Of the USAID contracts with aid
providers in Iraq, none of the eight that are publicly available
addresses such issues.  Certainly not all types of aid are likely to
431
raise concerns about norms of dignity, but some aid settings are
particularly problematic. For example, as noted above, those
providing humanitarian relief to refugees or internally displaced
persons living in camps may exercise almost complete control over
their beneficiaries, leading to the possibility of abuse.  Likewise,
432
when the foreign assistance involves privately contracted police
officers or when the contractors are working in highly dangerous
and unstable post-conflict settings such as Iraq, experience has
demonstrated that violations of the norms of human dignity are
more likely.  Thus, for at least some contracts, provisions concern-
433
ing such norms might be useful.
Compared to roughly analogous contracts in the domestic context,
contractual accountability for foreign aid contracts could certainly
be improved. First, foreign aid contracts could specify performance
terms and establish clear benchmarks. Second, provisions could
allow for increased monitoring when certain conditions are not met
or when it otherwise looks as if the contract is not being performed
satisfactorily. Third, foreign aid contracts could begin to use outside
accrediting organizations—as is now common in the domestic health
care setting —to ensure that private aid providers are qualified.
434
While there is no foreign aid equivalent to the domestic health care
accreditor NCQA, the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum
Standards in Disaster Response, developed by a consortium of
humanitarian aid organizations, aims to establish best practices in
the provision of such aid by nonprofits, including specific guidelines
for field operations, training, and self evaluation.  Contracting
435
agencies, therefore, could require that aid organizations agree to
the Sphere guidelines in order to receive contracts.  Indeed, the
436
contracts could explicitly incorporate these guidelines, thereby
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transforming them from non-binding voluntary standards into
mandatory contractual terms. Finally, where contractors are likely
to exercise any form of physical control over beneficiaries, contracts
could incorporate international human rights and humanitarian law
norms by requiring personnel to receive training in such norms and
to abide by them.
The domestic context may also provide some useful examples of
contracts that would allow for beneficiary participation in contract
design and evaluation. For example, Wisconsin’s contracts with
managed care organizations to provide health care to Medicare and
Medicaid recipients include provisions for participation by commu-
nity groups.  Similarly, foreign aid contracts could require aid
437
organizations to consult with beneficiary populations in the design
and implementation of programs. Some USAID field offices already
consult with beneficiary populations during the negotiation of
development aid contracts.  Such consultation, however, is less
438
common in the humanitarian aid and post-conflict reconstruction
contexts and for agencies other than USAID.  In any event, an
439
explicit contractual requirement would go a long way toward facil-
itating consultation with beneficiary populations. As discussed
above, such a requirement could help effectuate through contract a
broader form of democratic accountability that would include the
idea that aid providers should be accountable to aid beneficiaries.
Finally, the use of more explicit contractual terms could help to
establish a measure of legal accountability, regardless of the
problems posed by state action requirements. In the domestic
context, for example, some private contractors providing aid may
offer individual complaint mechanisms.  Although these aid
440
providers are not generally subject to the state action requirement
and are therefore immune from constitutional review,  such
441
contractual provisions do allow for notice and an opportunity to be
heard, thereby incorporating aspects of the constitutional due
process guarantees. Similar complaint mechanisms likewise could
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be included in foreign aid contracts to help enable beneficiaries to
challenge gross abuses. As noted above, the World Bank is begin-
ning to experiment with just this type of tribunal.  The domestic
442
setting may thus provide useful models for trying to assure some
measure of contractual accountability over foreign aid providers.
4. Internal Institutional Accountability
As in the military context, any comprehensive evaluation of
accountability in the provision of foreign aid must take into account
the internal institutional cultures of the various entities providing
the aid. Such analysis reveals that privatization does not necessar-
ily lead to reduced internal institutional accountability. Indeed, in
some cases, private organizations might provide more internal
accountability than governmental bureaucracies. Much depends, of
course, on the specific nature of the organization in question.
Important distinctions might be drawn between types of organiza-
tions, and thus this section will contrast the institutional cultures
of for-profit and nonprofit corporations. Such a distinction is
particularly useful to draw because it has been the subject of
existing research, though, obviously, other distinctions may also be
important. For example, religious-based charitable organizations
may be more likely to hold their members accountable for violations
of some norms but less likely to hold them accountable for others. In
addition, the culture of such organizations may vary based on the
type of faith (e.g., Muslim charities might have different priorities
from Christian ones), and their priorities may vary depending on
the type of conflict (e.g., whether the aid is being provided for a
conflict with religious dimensions).  It is also worth noting that aid
443
organizations are diverse, and any attempt to categorize inevitably
leads to oversimplification.  Much more work needs to be done to
444
examine the more subtle variations in institutional accountability
mechanisms. We can, however, at least begin to make some
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observations about the types of organizations that are more likely
to have institutional cultures that inculcate respect for the norms
of human dignity, rational governance, and/or anti-corruption, and
support the ideal of accountability. 
a. Nonprofits/Nongovernmental Organizations
In the international context, nonprofit organizations (or more
commonly, NGOs)  may be more likely than government bureau-
445
cracies and for-profit corporations to foster an internal organiza-
tional culture that promotes accountability for potential violations
of the norms of human dignity. Indeed, despite the variety of these
groups, NGOs do tend to share some general attributes. For
example, individuals who work for NGOs tend to be passionately
committed to values and ideals, and they may be willing to work for
far lower pay than they might receive from jobs in the private sector
or the government.  Moreover, the individuals working within
446
these organizations, and the organizations themselves, often
consider themselves to be part of a transnational community or
global civil society.  As such, even groups who do not have an
447
explicit mission to promote human rights tend to be familiar with,
and committed to, the provisions of international human rights and
humanitarian law.  NGOs are also known for their willingness to
448
openly criticize governments for violations of such norms.  Indeed,
449
some NGOs are so concerned with human rights that they worry
that forging any kind of alliance with governments could undermine
that commitment.  However, NGO culture may be less conducive
450
to accountability with respect to norms of rational and nonarbitrary
provision of services. This is because NGOs tend to have a generally
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nonhierarchical, action-oriented posture that places a premium on
the speedy provision of aid.  Although such an internal culture
451
may sometimes be useful, it may also lead to poor coordination with
other aid organizations and governments, and poor coordination
may in turn result in both costly duplication of some efforts and
total failure to serve more pressing needs.  Indeed, the organiza-
452
tional culture of NGOs may make it difficult for them to work with
governments, both those providing funding and those in charge of
the populations in need of aid.  As one commentator has noted
453
with respect to the relationship between intergovernmental
organizations and NGOs, it is a relationship between “bureaucracy
and the free spirits.”  Of course, the relatively freewheeling nature
454
of NGO culture does make NGOs capable of connecting with
individuals and groups at the grassroots level of recipient countries,
an ability that is often cited as a key reason for the increased use of
NGOs as aid providers.  At the same time, this quality may make
455
NGOs less likely to engage in self-evaluation or to develop a culture
of accountability to support the rational and successful provision of
aid.
Multiple studies over several decades have indicated that NGOs
do not effectively evaluate the success of their own programs and
are even “hostile to learning.”  Many organizations take as
456
“articles of faith” the assumption that they are effective in reaching
the poor, fostering grassroots participation, using money wisely, and
employing innovative approaches—all of which can be questioned
as an empirical matter.  In addition, they tend to view measures
457
of accountability, in the form of benchmarks and standards, as
impossible in the area of providing aid, where success is very
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difficult to measure.  Such a position may mean, however, that458
they fail to impose any form of internal accountability at all.  
459
In recent years, NGOs have taken some measures to assess
critically the effectiveness of their aid efforts. For example, they
have formed coordination networks, such as InterAction in the
United States, to ensure that aid is distributed in emergency
situations in a way that does not lead to waste and duplication.
460
These networks have also developed codes of conduct for NGOs
within their networks. For example, the InterAction code lays out
a set of “PVO standards” that NGOs voluntarily follow.  Similar
461
codes have been promulgated by other NGO networks.  Yet these
462
codes are often replete with “platitudes and generalities, with no
mention whatsoever of compliance, monitoring, complaints proce-
dures, and verification.”  Thus, despite these efforts, the institu-
463
tional culture of NGOs is unlikely to foster robust accountability
with regard to efficient, nonarbitrary administration of government
services.
b. For-Profit Firms
In contrast to NGOs and government agencies that are steeped in
international human rights and humanitarian law, for-profit groups
are far less likely to have an institutional culture focused on
accountability for violations of norms of human dignity. This
difference partly reflects the obvious point that for-profit companies
are motivated by profit rather than a sense of “mission.” And
because for-profit firms pay higher salaries than NGOs and
government agencies, individual employees are less likely to be
motivated primarily by passion and respect for the values inherent
in the provision of aid and services.
It is true, of course, that in recent years the corporate responsibil-
ity movement has sought to change corporate culture to increase
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respect for human rights. For example, corporations have engaged
in voluntary self-regulation, promoted internal education, and
agreed to abide by international human rights norms.  More
464
research is needed, however, to assess whether these efforts have
produced concrete effects within corporate bureaucracies. Certainly,
just as there are a variety of NGOs, corporations vary considerably
and have disparate institutional cultures.  In addition, as in the
465
military context, many of the individuals who join for-profit aid
organizations spent time working in the government sector, so there
is a good degree of permeability between the two cultures. As a
whole, however, for-profit companies are likely to be less attentive
to the norms of human rights, international humanitarian law, and
anticorruption as a core feature of their activities. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that corporate aid providers have been implicated in
human rights abuses on several occasions, such as the DynCorp sex
trafficking scandal in Bosnia discussed above.  
466
By contrast, the for-profit corporate world is far more likely than
NGOs or government bureaucracies to have a culture that values
rational and nonarbitrary management of programs. Likewise, for-
profit corporations are more likely to impose institutional sanctions
for the failure to meet performance targets. Here, the profit motive,
channeled through the discipline of the market, helps to enforce a
degree of rational management of programs and to ensure account-
ability for failure to do so.  
467
Of course, there are instances in which the market fails to
exercise the requisite discipline, particularly when conditions of
competition and perfect information do not exist. For example,
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undisclosed no-bid cost-plus contracts are subject to monopoly
pricing and waste because the accountability imposed by the market
is greatly reduced (or eliminated). Nevertheless, for-profit compa-
nies that enter into government contracts are more likely to
maintain some mechanisms of institutional accountability to ensure
the rational provision of services.
Much more work is needed to analyze with precision the various
types of organizations that provide foreign aid and the institutional
cultures that these organizations bring to the job. Only by doing so
can we identify which organizations are most likely to do the job (or
at least some aspects of it) well and which may require additional
monitoring or incentives to be truly effective. Ultimately, if govern-
ments are going to continue doling out foreign aid through private
contractors, they should know more about those contractors and the
internal institutional accountability they bring to the job.
CONCLUSION
The past two decades have seen a quiet revolution in the way
the United States and other countries act abroad. Privatization,
long a fixture of the domestic American scene, has gone global.
International law scholars must take up the challenge of privatiza-
tion by studying it as a distinct phenomenon, with its own particu-
lar obstacles and opportunities. Merely arguing that formal
international law instruments should be expanded to apply to
private contractors is not enough. Given the weak enforcement
mechanisms of international law, such a strategy, though necessary,
is likely to have only limited impact. 
This Article has therefore proposed a different approach. Drawing
on the extensive domestic administrative law literature on privat-
ization, this Article has sought to identify an array of accountability
mechanisms that might provide additional strategies for retaining
crucial public values in an era of private contracting. First, with
regard to legal accountability, despite the state-centered focus of
international law, private contractors may still be sued under the
Alien Tort Claims Act (with its more relaxed conception of state
action), prosecuted in domestic courts for violating ordinary criminal
law statutes, and subjected to municipal contract or tort remedies.
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Second, mechanisms to ensure some measure of democratic
accountability—conceived broadly to include accountability to those
most affected by the governmental acts—could be built into the
contracts that are the engine of privatization. Third, a wide variety
of contractual terms—from specific benchmarks, to training and
other procedural requirements, to compliance regimes—can be
included in government contracts and then enforced by a combina-
tion of government oversight, independent monitoring, and new
industry standards. Fourth, the internal institutional culture of
bureaucratic, corporate, and organizational entities can be har-
nessed and shaped to encourage compliance with public norms.
Finally, each of these approaches can be used to reinforce the
others.
None of these mechanisms is perfect, however. The legal avenues
remain regrettably meager, democratic participation requirements
(even limited ones) may be unwieldy and normatively unpalatable,
contract compliance and oversight are expensive and often unsuc-
cessful, and internal institutional accountability may or may not
have a substantial disciplining effect. And of course, any attempt to
build mechanisms of public accountability into a privatization
regime threatens to wipe out the purported efficiency gains of
privatization altogether.
Yet, for international law scholars who must grapple daily with
the limited enforcement power of international legal institutions,
privatization actually provides an important opportunity because
the moment of contracting is always a moment when oversight is
possible. Scholars could conceive of the contract relationship as the
creation of a trust, in which the trustee contractor is accountable to
both the government that authorizes the trust and the beneficiaries
who are most affected. Such creative use of private law principles
may even provide greater avenues of accountability than the
application of public international law norms to state actors. 
Most important, both administrative law and international law
scholars must enter into a creative dialogue with each other. They
must recognize that the privatization of foreign affairs is now an
entrenched trend around the world. Together they must develop
possible approaches for holding private contractors accountable for
their actions. Only through a systematic understanding of privatiza-
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tion in the international sphere can public norms and values be
maintained in a world of government for hire.
